The New Estate and Gift Tax Regime by Taggart, John Y.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 3 Article 5 
10-1-1982 
The New Estate and Gift Tax Regime 
John Y. Taggart 
Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Y. Taggart, The New Estate and Gift Tax Regime, 31 Buff. L. Rev. 797 (1982). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol31/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
THE NEW ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REGIME
JOHN Y. TAGGART*
INTRODUCTION ..................................... 799
I. THE CHANGES IN BRIEF ............................. 801
A. Increased Unified Credit ..................... 801
B. The Reduction in the Top Estate and Gift Tax
R ate ....................................... 802
C. Unlimited Marital Deduction and the New Ex-
ception to the Terminable Interest Rule ....... 802
D. Joint Property .............................. 803
E. The Per Donee Exclusion, the Education and
Medical Exclusion and the Annual Payment of
Gift Tax .................................... 804
F. Transfers Made Within Three Years of Death. . 804
G. Basis of Property Acquired from a Decedent ... 806
H . Disclaim ers ................................. 806
I. Current Use Valuation of Certain Property .... 807
J. Extension of Time for Payment of Estate Tax
Attributable to Interests in Closely Held Busi-
nesses ...................................... 807
K. Charitable Contributions of Art Works ........ 808
L. The Orphans' Deduction ..................... 809
M. Generation-Skipping Tax ..................... 809
H. THE CHANGES IN DETAIL ............................ 809
A. Legislative History ........................... 809
B. Increased Unified Credit ..................... 811
1. In general ............................... 811
2. Legislative history ........................ 811
3. The practical significance of the increase ... 813
4. The practical significance of the phase-in... 814
C. Reduction in Top Rate ....................... 816
1. In general ............................... 816
* Partner, Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives, New York, New York; Adjunct Professor of
Law, New York University, B.S. in Business Administration, 1953, Ohio State University,
J.D., 1959 Ohio State College of Law; LL.M., 1964, New York University.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
2. Legislative history ........................ 816
3. The soundness of the revised rate schedule . 817
D. Unlimited Marital Deduction ................. 819
1. In general ............................... 819
2. Legislative history ........................ 820
3. Should one use the unlimited estate tax mar-
ital deduction? .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  821
4. State death tax considerations ............. 830
5. Should estates be equalized? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
6. The use of an equalization clause .......... 835
7. Handling of administrative expenses ....... 837
8. Alternate valuation date election .......... 840
E. Qualified Terminable Interest Property ........ 844
1. In general ............................... 844
2. Legislative history ........................ 845
3. Qualified terminable interest property and its
characteristics ........................... 845
F. Joint Property .............................. 852
1. In general ............................... 852
2. Legislative history ........................ 853
3. Significance of the change ................ 854
G. Increase in Per Donee Gift Tax Exclusion and
Annual Filing of Returns ..................... 857
1. In general ............................... 857
2. Legislative history ........................ 858
3. Significance of the increase ............... 859
4. The exclusion of tuition and medical ex-
penses .................................. 862
5. Effective dates and Crummey trusts ....... 864
H. Estate Tax Treatment of Transfers Made Within
Three Years of Death ........................ 867
1. In general ............................... 867
2. Legislative history ........................ 869
3. The significance of the change ............. 870
I. Basis of Property Acquired from the Decedent . 872
J. Extension of Time for Payment of Estate
Tax Respecting Interests in Closely Held
Businesses .................................. 875
K . Disclaim ers ................................. 876
1. In general ............................... 876
[Vol. 31
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
2. Legislative history ........................ 878
3. Problems with the change ................. 879
CONCLUSION ........................................ 882
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, with comparatively little advance notice, Congress
substantially revised the United States federal estate and gift tax
laws, necessitating in most situations the alteration of existing wills
and estate plans.' In 1981, in the Economic Recovery Tax Act,
Congress again revised federal estate and gift tax laws and another
review of wills and estate plans is in order.2 This Article will pro-
vide a brief summary of the various changes which were made by
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and then make a detailed
analysis of most of those changes and their impact upon estates
and estate planning. There will, however, be no detailed discussion
of the special use of valuation changes.
Although some of the 1976 changes could be considered quix-
otic-for example, the orphans' deduction and the minimum mari-
tal deduction-in most cases the changes involved had real sub-
stance. The most significant, lasting change of the 1976 reforms
was the unification of the estate and gift taxes. The new 1981 es-
tate and gift tax regime retains that change. Prior to 1976, the gift
tax rates had been three-quarters of the estate tax rates, and in
computing estate taxes no consideration was given to prior gifts, no
matter how extensive. The 1976 changes quite properly recognized
'the interconnection between lifetime and death transfers and ap-
plied a single rate schedule. The change considered lifetime trans-
fers in determining the proper rate of tax to be applied to testa-
mentary transfers. Carryover basis, an equally significant 1976
reform-a repeal of the rule which stepped-up the basis of all as-
sets passing through a decedent's estate so that any capital gains
which had accrued but had not been realized were forgiven.--did
not survive the concerted onslaught which was mounted against it
and was repealed in 1978.3 The 1976 Act also introduced, primarily
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 [hereinafter cited as Tax
Reform Act of 1976].
2. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 [hereinafter
cited as ERTA].




for the benefit of farmers, the special use valuation of section
2032A. This section permitted the undervaluation of farm property
so long as certain conditions were met, all of which were designed
to see that the land continued to be farmed. This is a provision
which the 1981 changes expanded.4 The 1976 reforms also included
tinkering with the rules reflecting jointly held property, which have
now been further changed by the 1981 Act.'
The 1981 changes, generally not effective until 1982, and in
important cases phased-in over several years, have many interest-
ing aspects, but the most significant are these:
(1) The introduction in 1982 of an unlimited estate tax and gift
tax marital deduction so that one spouse may transfer totally
tax-free all of his or her assets to the other.' The reasons it
will almost always be wise from a tax standpoint to utilize
these provisions will be examined below.
(2) The adoption of a new form of marital deduction trust which
permits the decedent to specify the disposition of the marital
property at the death of the surviving spouse. This change
will make the use of the 100% marital deduction feasible.
(3) An increase, phased-in over six years, of the unified estate
and gift tax credit to $192,800 (the equivalent of a $600,000
exemption) from a unified credit of $47,000 (the equivalent of
a $175,625 exemption).8 This change is expected to have the
effect of dramatically reducing the number of estates which
are obligated to file returns or pay estate taxes, but whether
this will actually occur only time and inflation will tell. It will
also change estate planning practices.
(4) The reduction over a four year period of the top estate and
gift rate to 50% from 70%.2 The phase-in of the unified
credit over six years and the reduction of the top rates over
four years means that existent planning is not yet obsolete,
"but new planning will be necessary to deal with the phase-in.
(5) The increase of the gift tax per donee exclusion to $10,000
4. I.R.C. § 2032A(b) (1982), amended by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 421.
5. I.R.C. § 2040 (1982), amended by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(c).
6. I.R.C. § 2056 (1982).
7. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982).
8. LR.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1982).
9. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2) (1982).
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from $3,000.10 This means that a married couple can give
$20,000 to each of their children and grandchildren every
year tax-free. These transfers will not be included in the es-
tate tax base.
(6) Property held by spouses jointly with the right of survivor-
ship will be deemed, after 1981, to be owned half by each,
irrespective of the source of the contribution used to acquire
or improve the property.11 The complex 1976 joint marital
property scheme has been repealed.12 The unlimited marital
deduction made a change in the joint property rules unneces-
sary as a practical matter, but there was no reason not to
simplify those rules in light of the conclusion by Congress
that marital property is not "his" or "hers," but "theirs."
Although there were many other changes made in the es-
tate and gift taxes in the 1981 legislation, those enumerated
above are the most significant and, in contrast to certain fea-
tures of the 1976 legislation, quite simple and straightfor-
ward. Yet with these relatively simple changes, Congress has
fashioned an estate and gift tax regime which drastically al-
ters estate planning. It changes estate planning not only in
the tax sense, but raises new personal issues for husbands
and wives to wrestle with as they think about the ultimate
disposition of their property. Do the tax advantages of equali-
zation of estates outweigh the practical consequences? To
what extent should bequests to children, for example, be
postponed in light of the unlimited marital deduction? Tax
advantages aside, is it sensible to transfer $20,000 a year to a
child?
I. THE CHANGES IN BRw'
A. Increased Unified Credit
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 enlarges the unified
estate and gift tax credit to $192,800 from $47,000, the equivalent
of a $600,000 exemption, over six years beginning in 1982 as set
forth below:13
10. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982).
11. LR.C. § 2040(b) (1982).
12. I.R.C. § 2040(c)(1) (1976), repealed by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(c)(3)(A).
13. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1982).
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Year Amount of Credit Equivalent Exemption
1982 $ 62,800 $225,000
1983 $ 79,300 $275,000
1984 $ 96,300 $325,000
1985 $121,800 $400,000
1986 $155,800 $500,000
1987 and beyond $192,800 $600,000
The unified credit for nonresident aliens was left at $3,600.14
The Act, as might be expected, revises the estate tax filing re-
quirements to tie them into the increased unified credit. As is pres-
ently the rule, the filing requirement is reduced by the sum of any
adjusted taxable gifts made by the decedent after December 31,
1976, and by the amount of any specific gift tax exemption under
prior law which may have been used by the decedent with respect
to gifts made after September 8, 1976, and before January 1, 1977.
B. The Reduction in the Top Estate and Gift Tax Rate
Under the Act, the maximum estate and gift tax rate is re-
duced by five percentage points a year over a four year period (to
50% from 70%) beginning in 1982.15
C. Unlimited Marital Deduction and the New Exception to the
Terminable Interest Rule
Under the new law, the 50% marital deduction (with the
$250,000 minimum estate tax and $100,000 minimum gift tax mari-
tal deduction) has been altered to permit an unlimited estate and
gift tax marital deduction.16 Thus, one spouse can transfer an un-
limited amount of property tax-free to the other spouse, and es-
tates may be freely equalized. Consistent with this change, trans-
fers of community property are now eligible for the marital
deduction.
17
In addition, the Act introduces a new kind of terminable inter-
est which qualifies for the marital deduction. The new inter-
est-"qualified terminable interest property"-has the effect of
14. I.R.C. § 2102(c)(1) (1982).
15. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c)(1), 2502(a) (1982).
16. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A) (1976) (imposing a 50% limitation), repealed by ERTA,
supra note 2, at § 403(a)(1)(A).
17. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(C)" (1976) (providing for a community property adjustment), re-
pealed by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403 (a)(1)(A).
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permitting the spouse who predeceases to avail him or herself of
the unlimited marital deduction and at the same time specify pre-
cisely how the remainder interest is to pass on the death of the
surviving spouse."' Qualified terminable interest property will per-
mit some post-mortem estate planning by allowing election to be
made by the executor at the time the estate tax return of the dece-
dent is filed.
Because of the changes in the marital deduction and the possi-
ble effect on pre-existing wills, Congress provided, consistent with
its approach to the minimum marital deduction in the 1976
changes,19 that the old law will continue to apply to wills executed
prior to 30 days after the date of enactment, if not subsequently
amended to indicate specifically an intent to adopt the unlimited
marital deduction. The new law will apply, however, to all wills
with respect to which the governing state enacts a law which con-
strues the reference to the old formula to encompass the new.2"
The Act was signed into law on August 13,'1981, and became effec-
tive 30 days thereafter. Therefore, the new law will apply to wills
executed on or after September 12, 1981.
D. Joint Property
Somewhat submerged in the marital deduction changes, but
important in its own right, is a major change with respect to joint
property.2' It will be recalled that for many years section 2040 pro-
vided that property held jointly with a right of survivorship was
includable in the estate of the first to die, except to the extent the
survivor could demonstrate what he or she had contributed to the
acquisition of the property. In 1976, Congress revised this scheme
to introduce the concept of a qualified joint interest.2 2 Then, in
1978, it provided for treating material participation in a farm or
other business by the surviving spouse as a contribution to joint
property.23 The qualified joint interest concept permitted a hus-
band and wife, by electing to have a transfer into joint names
18. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982).
19. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 1, at § 2002(d)(1).
20. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(e)(3).
21. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2) (1976), amended by ERTA, supra note 2, at 403(c)(1).
22. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2) (1982).
23. I.R.C. § 2040(c) (amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat.
2763), repealed by ERTA, supra note 2, § 403(c)(3)(A).
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treated as a gift, to exclude one-half the value of jointly held prop-
erty from the estate of the first to die.
Under the new law these provisions, which in the case of mate-
rial participation were quite complicated, were repealed, although
the qualified joint interest terminology was retained. Under section
2040(b), joint property held by husband and wife is included in the
estate of the first to die only to the extent of one-half of the value
of the property.
E. The Per Donee Exclusion, the Education and Medical Exclu-
sion, and the Annual Payment of Gift Tax
Under the Act, the annual gift tax per donee exclusion is in-
creased to $10,000 from $3,000.24 Thus, a couple who elects to split
gifts may transfer $20,000 a year to an unlimited number of donees
without paying any gift tax or having the transfers considered for
purposes of computing the estate tax. Furthermore, the Act pro-
vides, in effect, an unlimited exclusion for amounts paid as tuition
to a recognized educational organization or for medical care, as
such amounts are not deemed to be gifts.25 Finally, the Act restores
the requirement that gift tax returns be filed annually rather than
quarterly as is now required after a certain threshold.26 Gift tax
returns are due, beginning in 1982, on April 15. This is the same
time that the income tax return of a taxpayer filing on a calendar
year basis is due. If there is an extension of time granted for in-
come tax purposes, it also applies for gift tax purposes. However,
in the year of death the annual gift tax return is required to be
fied on the date for filing the donor's estate tax return (including
extensions), if that is earlier than April 15 (or any extended date).
F. Transfers Made Within Three Years of Death
Since 1916, when first enacted, the federal estate tax law has
either presumed that any transfer made within two (later three)
years of death was made in contemplation of death and, therefore,
should be included in decedent's gross estate to prevent the avoid-
ance of estate tax, or the inclusion has been mandated, irrespective
of intention. However, changes made by the Revenue Act of 1976
24. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982).
25. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (1982).
26. I.R.C. § 6075(b) (1982).
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substantially reduced the significance of transfers made within
three years of death, although section 2035 was continued in the
law and inclusion was made mandatory. Under the unification of
the estate and gift taxes which was adopted in 1976, any lifetime
transfer made before or within three years of death is considered
in determining the total life and death transfers of the decedent,
and also in determining the estate tax which will be finally levied
upon the assets passing at his death (because of the inclusion of
gifts made during one's life in the estate tax base, a credit is al-
lowed against the estate tax for any gift tax paid).
The net effect of the unified system was that in the case of a
transfer made within three years of death, only the appreciation of
the property between the date of the gift and death was subject to
a tax which would not otherwise be imposed. In other words, the
mere transfer itself was treated as a transfer which had to be con-
sidered in determining the total life and death transfers of the de-
cedent and in fixing the tax imposed, although it would be consid-
ered only to the extent of the value at the time of the gift. The
practical effect of section 2035 after 1976 was, therefore, to require
the additional inclusion of the amount of appreciation of the prop-
erty since the gift.
In the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Congress con-
cluded that except in a few limited situtations there was no longer
any point in including property transferred within three years of
death in the decedent's gross estate. It recognized that the only
impact of such a rule was to include appreciation; the value of the
property itself was already being included under the general rules
relating to the unified transfer tax. Thus, the old rule was largely
repealed, effective January 1, 1982. However, the old rule will con-
tinue to apply with respect to gifts of life insurance and property
which, if held at death, would be includable in the gross estate
pursuant to sections 2036, 2037, 2038, and 2041. Moreover, Con-
gress determined that gifts made within three years of death
should be included in the decedent's gross estate to determine the
estate's eligibility for favorable redemption, valuation and deferral
provisions (under sections 303, 2032A, and 6166). This rule was in-
tended to preclude deathbed transfers designed to qualify the es-




tate for favorable treatment. Whether these changes will result in
an undue complication of the law remains to be seen.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the change is its impact
on income taxes. The effect for income tax purposes of including
property in the gross estate is that the property receives a step-up
in basis to fair market value at the date of the decedent's death (or
the alternate valuation date, if that were elected). The beginning
rate on the first dollar of taxable estate will be 37% and the maxi-
mum capital gains rate is reduced to 20%. However, despite the
lower income tax rate, the value of the exclusion of appreciation
from estate tax will not always be greater than the value of the
step-up in basis for income tax purposes that would result from
inclusion. As will be explained in the detailed discussion below, the
estate tax cost of inclusion may be less, especially in cases of gifts
of appreciated property, than the potential capital gains tax liabil-
ity with respect to the property.
G. Basis of Property Acquired from a Decedent
Under the Act a special rule is adopted beginning in 1982
which provides that the basis step-up rules of section 1014 will not
apply with respect to appreciated property acquired by the dece-
dent through a gift within one year of his death if the property
passes, directly or indirectly, from the donee-decedent to the origi-
nal donor or the donor's spouse.28 The purpose of this provision is
to preclude deathbed transfers to a prospective decedent where the
property would be returned to the donor, hopefully with a
stepped-up basis as a result of its passing through the estate of the
decedent.
H. Disclaimers
The Act modifies section 2518 relating to disclaimers, added to
the gift tax statute by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The 1981
change provides that the timely transfer of property to the person
who would have received it had an effective disclaimer been made
under applicable local law shall be deemed to be an effective dis-
claimer for federal estate and gift tax purposes, assuming the other
requirements for a qualified disclaimer are met. Section 2518 has
28. I.R.C. § 1014(e) (1982).
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engendered a considerable amount of controversy and a good deal
of scholarly writing. For reasons expressed in the detailed discus-
sion below, it is doubtful whether this change will do much to
eliminate the problems of section 2518.
I. Current Use Valuation of Certain Property
Under present section 2032A, real property, which ordinarily
must be included at fair market value at its highest and best use,
may, in the case of family farms and real estate used in closely
held businesses, be included at its current use value if certain con-
ditions are met. However, the gross estate may not be reduced by
more than $500,000 as a result of this provision.
The provisions of section 2032A would appear to have more to
do with practical politics than with tax policy. Moreover, they
serve to establish beyond peradventure that complexity-which
polemicists argue is to be eschewed in any provision that can be
regarded as burdening a taxpayer (like the generation-skipping
tax)-is not a factor to be considered in a pro-taxpayer provision.
There are numerous articles which explain present section
2032A, and someone with more strength than the present author
will describe in detail the seventeen technical changes made in this
provision (as counted in a Joint Committee on Taxation staff sum-
mary) which have assumed a variety and complexity that almost
overwhelm the estate tax itself.29 In the House report, a substantial
portion of the discussion relating to the estate and gift tax changes
is devoted to the current use valuation provision.30 No further at-
tention will be given to section 2032A in this Article.
J. Extension of Time for Payment of Estate Tax Attributable to
Interests in Closely Held Businesses
Those provisions contained in old sections 6166 and 6166A of
the Internal Revenue Code were related and more justifiable. For
reasons not readily apparent at the time, Congress in 1976 decided
to leave intact section 6166A, a provision which originated in the
29. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY AcT OF 1981, 241-54 (Comm. Print 1981).




Small Business Tax Revision Act of 195831 as section 6166, and to
provide additional relief with respect to the payment of estate
taxes on closely held businesses in a new, separate section desig-
nated section 6166. The current Act wisely repealed one of these
overlapping provisions, section 6166A.3 2 It also substantially liber-
alized the provisions of section 6166. 3 These changes will be de-
scribed in a bit more detail below, but the most significant is re-
ducing to 35% the requirement of present section 6166 that the
closely held business interest must comprise at least 65% of the
adjusted gross estate.
34
K. Charitable Contributions of Art Works
The Act provides a limited change with respect to estate and
gift tax deductions in the case of transfers of copyrightable works
of art. Under present law, where a charitable transfer is of an in-
terest which is less than the donor's entire interest in property, no
charitable deduction is allowed unless the gift is made in certain
specified forms.35 An original work of art and a related copyright
are considered interests in the same property. Therefore, under
present law, no charitable deduction is allowed for the transfer of
an original work of art to charity if the copyright is retained or
transferred to someone other than a charity.
The Act amends sections 2055 and 2522 to provide that where
a donor or decedent makes a charitable contribution of a copy-
rightable work of art after 1981, the work of art and its copyright
will be treated as separate properties." Thus, a charitable deduc-
tion will be allowed for a transfer of the work of art to a charity
even though the copyright is not simultaneously transferred.
31. Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 206(a), 72 Stat. 689,
1606, repeated by ERTA, supra note 2, at 422(d).
32. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 422(d).
33. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 422(a).
34. See generally Kahn, Closely Held Stocks-Deferral and Financing of Estate Tax
Costs Through Sections 303 and 6166, 35 TAx LAW. 639 (1982).
35. I.R.C. §§ 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2) (1982).
36. I.R.C. §§ 2055(e)(4), 2522(c)(3) (1982).
808 [Vol. 31
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
L. The Orphans' Deduction
The orphans' deduction, introduced in the Revenue Act of
1976, is repealed in the case of decedents dying after December 31,
1981. 3'
M. Generation-Skipping Tax
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 introduced a tax on so-called
generation-skipping transfers designed to prevent estate tax avoid-
ance by the creation of a trust which extended over several genera-
tions. However, a limited transitional rule exempts from the gener-
ation-skipping tax trusts created by wills or revocable trusts in
existence on June 11, 1976, if two conditions are met: first, such
wills and trusts could not be amended after that date to create or
increase the amount of any generation-skipping transfer, and sec-
ond, the testator or trust-grantor must die before January 1,
1982.8 Accordingly, under this provision, a generation-skipping tax
would be imposed in the case of all decedents dying on January 1,
1982, or thereafter, irrespective of when the generation-skipping
transfer was made.
Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the transi-
tional rule has been extended one year. 9 The generation-skipping
tax will accordingly not apply in the case of pre-June 12, 1976,
wills and trusts, provided that they are not amended to increase
the generation-skipping amount and the testator or trust grantor
dies before January 1, 1983. This does not change the present ap-
plication of the generation-skipping tax to all wills and trusts pres-
ently being prepared and existing generation-skipping trusts cre-
ated by wills or inter vivos deeds after June 11, 1976.
II. THE CHANGES IN DETAIL
A. Legislative History
w Because the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had a some-
what unusual procedural history, it will be helpful to set out how
the legislation developed.
37. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 1, at § 427(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 2057 (1977)),
repealed by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 427(a).
38. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 1, at § 2006(e).
39. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 428.
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The original proposals of President Reagan were introduced in
the House of Representatives on March 10, 1981, as H.R. 2400.40
The bill was a comparatively simple one as the President's propos-
als were limited to rate reduction, changes in depreciation and the
extension of the at-risk rules to the investment tax credit. The
Reagan administration had expressed a strong desire that there be
a so-called "clean bill" which could move rapidly through
Congress.
Neither the House Ways and Means Committee nor the Sen-
ate Finance Committee shared this predilection for a clean bill,
and the Finance Committee was eager, probably for political rea-
sons, to push the Ways and Means Committee to early action.
Both the Senate and House began developing bills that were sub-
stantially broader than the Reagan administration indicated it
would like, although the President recognized that he had no real
alternative but to accept the congressionally popular provisions of
these bills and ultimately withdrew his objections.
The Senate bill41 developed essentially along Republican lines
since the Republican party was in control of the Finance Commit-
tee, whereas the House bill42 was essentially a Democratic bill, the
Democrats being in control of the Ways and Means Committee.
This state of affairs led to the following parliamentary maneuvers:
On June 9, 1981, Representatives Barber Conable and Kent Hance
introduced H.R. 3849,'4 a bill which represented the administra-
tion's modified position which accepted many relief provisions it
had initially fought. Thereafter, the Ways and Means Committee
reported its bill, H.R. 4242," on July 24, 1981, and on the same
day Representatives Conable and Hance introduced H.R. 4260,' 5
which was in most respects identical to the bill developed by the
Finance Committee. In a vote taken on July 29, 1981, the House
voted to substitute the text of the second Conable-Hance bill for
the text of the Ways and Means Committee bill, and then to adopt
H.R. 4242 as amended. On July 6, 1981, the Senate voted to attach
40. H.R. 2400, 97th Cong., lst Seas., 127 CONG. REc. H831 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1981).
41. H.R.J. Res. 266 (Comm. on Finance), 97th Cong., 1st Sese. (1981).
42. H.R. 4242, 97th Cong., 1st Sees. (1981).
43. H.R. 3849, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. REc. H2783 (daily ed. June 9, 1981).
44. H.R. 4242, 97th Cong., 1st Sees., 127 CONG. REc. H4761 (daily ed. July 24, 1981).
45. H.R. 4260, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONG. REc. H4761 (daily ed. July 24, 1981).
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its bill as an amendment to House Joint Resolution 266,41 relating
to the budget, and proceeded on August 3, 1981, to adopt the
House Joint Resolution as amended.
The conference committee therefore had to deal with virtually
identical legislation. In a marathon series of meetings, the rela-
tively minor differences between the House and Senate bills were
rapidly resolved, and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was
forwarded to President Reagan for his signature. The President
signed the Act on August 13, 1981.
B. Increased Unified Credit
1. In general. As indicated above, the unified credit has been
dramatically increased, although the increase is phased-in over six
years so that the immediate impact was not that great. However,
the ultimate increase to $600,000 from an effective exemption of
$175,625 will produce major changes in revenues and planning
techniques.
Under pre-1982 law, approximately 8% of those who died in
the United States each year were required to file an estate tax re-
turn.47 One can assume that this change will have the effect, when
fully implemented, of very substantially reducing the number of
estate tax returns. The change was estimated to have less than a
$5,000,000 impact on receipts in 1982, but by 1986 the revenue loss
was estimated to be $3,834,000,000.48 No estimate was given for the
revenue loss in 1987 and beyond when the credit goes to $192,800.
2. Legislative history. One difference between the Senate
and House approach to the unified credit was that the House pro-
posed increasing the unified credit over a six year period, whereas
the Senate proposed a phase-in over five years.49 The House ver-
46. H.R.J. Res. 266, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S7274 (daily ed. July 8,
1981).
47. The 1982 World Almanac lists the following number of deaths for 1978, 1979, and
1980 respectively: 1,927,788, 1,906,000, and 1,986,000. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF
FACTS 954 (1982). The 1981 Statistical Abstract of the United States states that the follow-
ing number of estate tax returns were filed in 1978, 1979, and 1980 respectively: 160.000,
159,000, and 148,000. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DE"'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 256 (102d ed. 1981). Accordingly, about 8% of all decedents have
estate tax returns filed on their behalf.
48. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 155.
49. Id. at 154-55; S. RPr. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 124-25 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 144].
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sion prevailed. The Ways and Means Committee report, echoed by
the Finance Committee report with one exception, indicated the
reason for the increase in the unified credit was inflation and the
need to provide relief for estates containing farms, ranches, and
small businesses.50 The stated rationale was that the $47,000 credit
was intended to exempt small and moderate sized estates from es-
tate and gift taxes, but inflation had been pushing such estates and
gifts into higher brackets. The two reports also state that the
amount of the credit was inadequate to provide relief to farms and
small businesses and an increase was necessary so that estates
would no longer be forced to dispose of family businesses to pay
estate or gift taxes.
The Finance Committee report makes two statements not con-
tained in the report of the Ways and Means Committee. First, it
articulates the inflation rationale a bit more strongly by stating
that "inflation has increased the dollar value of property and,
therefore, the transfer tax burdens, without increasing real
wealth." 51 This has, of course, occurred, but one may speculate as
to whether that is the real reason behind the drive of farmers and
small businessmen for estate tax relief. My limited experience sug-
gests that in many areas of the country there have been dramatic
increases in real wealth. The value of holdings in real estate have
rapidly increased in many parts of the country far beyond the ef-
fects of inflation. Thus, individuals who had always conceived of
themselves as being of relatively modest means, suddenly discov-
ered that they had estates of $1,000,000 or more. No doubt they
were not pleasantly surprised to discover that, on their death, the
government would take what they regarded as a significant portion
of the estate through taxes. Empirical studies indicate that the de-
mise of the family farm is continuing apace, but that estate tax
burdens have had little to do with this phenomenon.2 Much more
50. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 155.
51. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 49, at 124.
52. See, e.g., 5 N. Him, AGRucULTURAL LAW § 41.02 (1982); Chapter 6, Tax Policy, of
Department of Agriculture, A Time to Choose: Summary Report on the Structure of Agri-
culture 91, 92 (1981):
In 1976, the taxation of estates was substantially revised.... Farm interests
argued that farm-operator families could not realize these higher values on
which estates were taxed without selling the land or removing it from farming.
*.. The Congress accepted this argument despite the fact that most purchases
of farm land were by farmers, at market value, for use as farms.
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significant is the movement away from the farm by offspring of
farmers, the spread of suburbs so that farm land suddenly becomes
too valuable for agricultural pursuits, and changes in farm econom-
ics which require substantially more land for economical farming,
thus making smaller farms obsolete."
The second interesting statement in the Finance Committee
report is, "[H]istorically, one of the principal reasons for estate
and gift taxes was to break up large concentrations of wealth."' 4 It
has been persuasively argued that this is not true, and that estate
and gift taxes have historically been associated with the need for
revenue during wars.55 Only in the 1930s was an attempt made to
mobilize these taxes to produce a more even distribution of wealth.
Furthermore, based on the evidence available, it seems relatively
clear that whatever the purpose of our present estate taxes, they
have no significant effect on the distribution of wealth. Wealth is
even more concentrated today than it was in the 1930s.5 There is,
however, no suggestion in the Finance Committee report that the
Committee is abandoning this assumed historic reason, even
though its action in reducing the top rates to 50% from 70% seems
inconsistent.
3. The practical significance of the increase. As previously
noted, when the increased unified credit is fully phased-in it will
dramatically reduce the number of estates filing estate tax returns.
This presumably will have some marginal effect upon those attor-
neys specializing in estate administration, although these estates
will still have to be administered. In many cases a state estate or
inheritance tax return will be prepared and, in any event, the ac-
tual problems of administration require significantly greater time
and energy than the preparation of the federal estate tax return.
Therefore, comparatively little impact can be expected on the bar.
As to prospective decedents, inflation and real increases in
wealth may substantially offset the impact of the increased unified
credit. A dollar doubles in about seven years at a 10% compound
See also N. Harl, Influencing the Structure of Agriculture Through Taxation 6 (Oct. 30,
1980) (unpublished paper).
53. See N. HARL, AGICULTUR LAW, supra note 52, at § 41.02.
54. S. Rep. No. 144, supra note 49, at 124.
55. Moran, Estate and Gift Taxation: The Case for Repeal, XIII TAx NoTEs, Aug. 17,
1981, at 339.
56. Id. at 340.
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rate, so that an estate of $1,200,000 today (and tax-free in 1987)
should conservatively become an estate of $2,400,000 in 1990, put-
ting aside the effects of inflation, and assuming all income and
growth is retained. Furthermore, as will be explored more fully in
connection with the reduction in rates and the effect of the unlim-
ited marital deduction, the combination of the unified credit, the
unlimited marital deduction, and the reduction in the top estate
tax rate to 50% makes the extremely wealthy the major benefi-
ciaries from the new estate and gift tax regime.
The increase of the unified credit to permit $600,000 to pass
tax-free means that with proper planning no tax will be paid on an
estate of $1,200,000. Using the unlimited gift tax marital deduc-
tion, the estate can be split $600,000 to husband and $600,000 to
wife, so that irrespective of who dies first, full use can be made of
both unified credits. The transferor of the $600,000 to equalize es-
tates would probably place the property in trust, income for life to
the surviving spouse, with the usual 5%, $5,000 invasion permitted
and an unlimited power of invasion in a friendly trustee. The re-
mainder would be left to the objects of the couple's bounty. Al-
though this formulation makes the property owned by the first to
die available as a practical matter to the surviving spouse, the sur-
viving spouse's estate will be only $600,000 and fully exempt by
reason of the unlimited credit. However, as will be explored below
in the discussion of the unlimited marital deduction, the tax cost
of not equalizing either during life or at death is not that great,
and non-tax considerations may suggest it not be done.
4. The practical significance of the phase-in. The phase-in
of the increase in unified credit will necessitate will clauses which
take account of the phase-in. Assume a testator with $1,200,000 in
property who, despite the unlimited marital deduction, proposes to
leave half of his property to his wife in a standard marital deduc-
tion trust and the other half in trust, income for life to her, re-
mainder to their children. When the unified credit is fully phased-
in, the net effect of this disposition will produce total estate tax
exemption. Six hundred thousand dollars will be subject to tax in
both the husband's and wife's estate, but any tax will be com-
pletely eliminated by their unified credits. Yet, when the unified
credit produces only a $275,000 exemption, as it will in 1983, a
somewhat different disposition may be indicated. For example, one
might wish to consider taking somewhat greater advantage of the
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marital deduction in order to produce an exemption in the first
estate. However, because increased use of the marital deduction
will make more property subject to tax in the estate of the surviv-
ing spouse, one would obviously wish to reduce to a minimum the
amount of marital deduction property and retain in the first estate
only that amount necessary to utilize as much of the unified credit
as is available in the estate of the first to die. Furthermore, besides
leaving $600,000 in the estate of the first to die, one should also
leave a sufficient amount so as to pay all deductible administration
expenditures. The handling of state death taxes will be discussed
below.
A will clause to achieve such a disposition is as follows:
RESIDUARY MARITAL DEDUCTION CLAUSE:
FIFTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal and wheresoever situate, including any property over which I may
have a power of disposition by Will or otherwise, I give, devise and bequeath
as follows:
I. If my spouse, [name], shall survive me, I direct my Executor to divide
my residuary estate into two parts. Part A *[the portion qualifying for the
unlimited marital deduction] shall be determined by a fraction, the numera-
tor of which shall be the maximum estate tax marital deduction allowable in
determining the federal estate tax on my estate (excluding any generation-
skipping transfers deemed part of my gross estate pursuant to section
2602(c)(5)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended), reduced by
the value of all other property interests forming a part of my gross estate
which qualify for such marital deduction and which property interests shall
have passed to my spouse in any other manner, and further reduced by the
amount, if any, necessary to reduce my taxable estate to the largest amount
that will, after taking into account all deductions allowable in determining
my taxable estate and the unified credit and the credit for state death taxes
(provided that the credit for state death taxes shall be taken into account
only to the extent that it does not result in an increase in state death taxes
otherwise payable), result in no federal estate tax on my estate. The denomi-
nator of the fraction shall be the value of my residuary estate. Part B [the
taxable portion] shall be the balance of my residuary estate. In making these
determinations, the values as finally determined in the federal estate tax pro-
ceeding shall control. Part A and Part B shall share proportionately in any
increase or decrease in the value of the property comprising such residuary
estate.
There shall not be allocated to Part A any asset or the proceeds of any
asset (a) which does not qualify for the marital deduction, or (b) with respect
to which a credit shall be allowable for estate or death taxes paid to any
foreign country or any of its possessions or subdivisions, except that assets
described in clause (b) may be so allocated to the extent that assets other
than those hereinbefore described are not sufficient.
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I dispose of said parts as follows:
A phase-in clause is also appropriate where the estate is under
$1,200,000. For example, once the unified credit is fully phased-in,
the proper disposition from a tax standpoint in an estate of
$800,000 would be to ensure that $600,000 is includable in the es-
tate of the first to die (which would be exempt from tax by reason
of the unified credit), and that only $200,000 is subject to tax in
the estate of the second. It would be sensible to use the unified
credit fully in the estate of the first to die even if it means that
some of the unified credit in the estate of the second to die goes
unused. Such a disposition protects against the effects of inflation,
which may push the surviving spouse's estate to higher levels, and
takes account of the possibility of increases in value due to wise
investments, inheritances, gifts, and so on. Survival until 1986 by
the spouse who retains $600,000 in assets to be taxed will produce
virtual exemption, and in 1987, total exemption. However, in such
a case in 1983, for example, only $275,000 should be kept in the
estate of the first to die. The clause set forth above would achieve
this effect.
C. Reduction in Top Rate
1. In general. The Act reduces the top estate and gift tax
rate to 50% from 70%, although the reduction is phased-in.57
Under the phase-in provision, the top rate drops to 65% in 1982
for estates of over $4,000,000, to 60% in 1983 for estates of over
$3,500,000, and to 55% in 1984 for estates of over $3,000,000. In
1985 the new top rate of 50% is applicable to estates of over
$2,500,000.
2. Legislative history. The proposal to reduce the top estate
tax rate to 50% from 70% originated in the House bill"8 and was
not contained at all in the Senate Finance Committee's bill. 9 The
Ways and Means Committee's justification was that present estate
and gift tax rates could result in more estate and gift taxes on
highly successful enterprises, closely held corporations, and family
businesses than their owners could afford without disposing of the
57. I.R.C. §§ 2001(c)(1), 2502(a) (1982).
58. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 156.
59. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 49.
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businesses. In order to prevent forced sales of such businesses, the
Committee believed that a rate reduction was appropriate. The
Committee also stated that it believed the reduction of the top
rate to 50% was consistent with its decision to reduce the maxi-
mum rate of income tax to 50%.
3. The soundness of the revised rate schedule. Under the
present rate schedule, the rates begin at 18% for a taxable estate
of not over $10,000 and increase at intervals to a rate of 32%
where an estate is over $150,000, but does not exceed $250,000.
These rates do not apply in any case because the unified credit of
$47,000 offsets the tax otherwise imposed on the first $175,625 of
the estate. Thus, as a practical matter, the first bracket for an es-
tate is 32% under present law. Under the present schedule an es-
tate of $2,500,000 is in the 49% bracket and an estate over
$2,500,000 and less than $3,000,000 is in the 50% bracket. After
$3,000,000 the rates continue their climb and reach 70% in estates
of over $5,000,000. When the reduction in rates is fully phased-in,
an estate of $2,500,000 will be in the 49% bracket, whereas all es-
tates of over $2,500,000 will be in the 50% bracket.
The effect of the rate change will sharply compress the rates,
especially when the reduced top rate is coupled with the increased
unified credit. See Chart 1 below, which compares the effective
rates under the present schedule with the effective rates in 1987:
CHART 1
1981 RATE SCHEDULE
Size of Effective Tax Less Effective
Estate Tax Rate Unified Credit Rate
$20,000,000 $13,050,800 65.3% $13,003,800 65%
$10,000,000 $ 6,050,800 60.5% $ 6,003,800 60%
$ 5,000,000 $ 2,550,800 51% $ 2,503,800 50%
$ 2,500,000 $ 1,025,800 41% $ 978,800 39.2%
$ 2,000,000 $ 780,800 39% $ 733,800 36.7%
1985 RATE SCHEDULE WITH AND WITHOUT 1987 UNIFIED CREDIT
Size of Effective Tax Less 1987 Effective
Estate Tax Rate Unified Credit Rate
$20,000,000 $ 9,775,800 48.9% $ 9,583,000 47.9%
$10,000,000 $ 4,775,800 47.7% $ 4,583,000 45.8%
$ 5,000,000 $ 2,275,800 45.5% $ 2,083,000 41.6%
$ 2,500,000 $ 1,025,800 41% $ 833,000 33.3%
$ 2,000,000 $ 780,800 39% $ 588,000 29.4%
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1985 RATE SCHEDULE WITH 1987 UNIFIED CREDIT AND
STATE DEATH TAX CREDIT
Tax Less 1987
Unified Credit
Size of Tax Less 1987 and State Death Effective
Estate Unified Credit Tax Credit Rate
$20,000,000 $9,583,000 $6,916,200 34.6%
$10,000,000 $4,583,000 $3,517,200 35.2%
$ 5,000,000 $2,083,000 $1,691,400 33.8%
$ 2,500,000 $ 833,000 $ 694,200 27.8%
$ 2,000,000 $ 588,000 $ 478,400 23.9%
Since the unified credit when fully phased-in will exempt the first
$600,000 of an estate, an estate of $601,000 will be in the 37%
bracket. If the estate is sufficiently within the 37% bracket to util-
ize the credit for state death taxes, the effective rate of credit on
$600,000 is .0273, so the overall effective rate is reduced to 34.27 %.
The 50% rate will be available for estates of $2,500,000 and over.
One may question the advisability of this rate structure. While the
use of a unified credit rather than an exemption makes the rate
schedule on its face look more progressive than it in fact is, an
individual with an estate of $750,000 may very well wonder why he
should pay tax at a top rate of 39% when his neighbor with a
$20,000,000 estate pays a top rate of 50%. Although the spread of
effective rates is far greater than 11 points (it is 40.5 points, the
difference between a 7.4%, $55,500 tax on $750,000, and 47.9%), it
is not clear that this will console the $750,000 taxpayer. These con-
siderations suggest a spreading of brackets so that the 50% rate is
not reached until $10,000,000. Moreover, under the rate table as
revised by the Act, decedents with estates between $2,000,000 and
$2,500,000 have a particular grievance. The rate table rises from
37 % in two point intervals to 45 % for a $2,000,000. estate, but then
immediately jumps to 49% for an estate between $2,000,000 and
$2,500,000. Once the $2,500,000 threshhold is reached, the rate
goes up one percentage point to 50%.
One may question whether the 50% maximum will survive.
This is especially so in view of the Finance Committee statement
in connection with the unified credit that the estate tax has histor-
ically been intended to break up concentrations of wealth. As
noted above, this is not a provision which the Senate Finance
Committee, typically more estate tax reduction oriented than the
Ways and Means Committee, initiated. One may suspect that the
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advocacy of this provision by the House had more to do with polit-
ics than with deep felt conviction. The House justification for lim-
iting the tax on "highly successful closely held corporations and
family businesses" because the present tax was more "than their
owners could afford without disposing of the businesses" seems a
bit hollow when it is recognized that under then-existing law a rate
in excess of 50% was not reached unless the estate was more than
$2,500,000. One sees the primary beneficiaries of this change as in-
dividuals with estates of $10,000,000 or more. For a $10,000,000
estate, there is a $1,275,000 estate tax reduction and for a
$20,000,000 estate, a $3,275,000 reduction (ignoring the effect of
the unified credit). The fact that these reductions will be welcomed
by the heirs of such a decedent does not weaken the possibility
that the change will have almost no effect on successful, closely
held businesses and farms.
In light of all these considerations, one would anticipate that
there would be further revisions in our estate and gift tax rates
within the next few years. Alternatively, the reductions in revenue
occasioned by the 1981 Act, acting on what is already a very small
contribution to federal revenues, produces a potent argument for
complete repeal of the estate and gift tax. 0
From the perspective of the estate planner, the reduction in
the top rate should have comparatively little significance. There is
little or no doubt that clients will be just as reluctant to pay 50%
of their estate to the federal government as they are to pay 70%. It
can therefore be anticipated that planning for larger estates will
continue at its present level even with the unlimited marital de-
duction, and one would anticipate that the use of trusts by the
wealthy will not diminish to any significant degree, especially if the
generation-skipping tax is repealed.
D. Unlimited Marital Deduction
1. In general. The marital deduction for estate and gift tax
purposes, which was first introduced into the law in 194861 as part
of the income tax changes made at that time dealing with the
problems created by the tax advantages of community property,
was not changed in any significant manner until 1976. As is well
60. See Moran, supra note 55.
61. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 110, 117-21.
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known, an unlimited gift tax marital deduction was adopted in
1976 for transfers between spouses for the first $100,000 of taxable
gifts.62 No deduction was allowed for the next $100,000, and there-
after a deduction was allowed for 50% of interspousal transfers.
The estate tax marital deduction, which had been previously lim-
ited to one-half of the adjusted gross estate, was changed to permit
a marital deduction equal to the greater of $250,000 or one-half of
the adjusted gross estate. In effect, the estate tax marital deduc-
tion permitted an unlimited marital deduction to the extent of
$250,000. There was a provision adjusting the estate tax marital
deduction where the unlimited $100,000 gift tax marital deduction
had been used and not offset by the transfer of an additional
$100,000 not eligible for the deduction.6
2. Legislative history. Both the Senate Finance Committee
and the House Ways and Means Committee adopted the unlimited
marital deduction, although the reasons given for the proposal
were somewhat different. However, the Senate bill did not contain
provisions creating the new concept of qualified terminable inter-
est property and permitting such property to qualify for the mari-
tal deduction.
The Senate report simply states that a husband and wife
should be treated as one economic unit for the purpose of estate
and gift taxes as they generally are for income tax purposes, and
therefore no tax should be imposed on transfers between a hus-
band and wife." It would not seem to be quibbling to point out
that a husband and wife are not uniformly treated as a single eco-
nomic unit for income tax purposes. First, they are treated as a
single economic unit only if they elect that treatment by filing a
joint return. Second, couples in community property states are not
treated as a single economic unit, and the tax treatment of hus-
band and wife in common law jurisdictions is more intended to
equate their treatment to the results in community property juris-
dictions than it is to treat them as one economic unit. Third, this
rationale was undercut by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
itself, as it adopted a provision designed to mitigate the so-called
marriage penalty.65
62. I.R.C. § 2523(a) (2) (amended by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(b)(1)).
63. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(B) (repealed by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(a)(1)(A)).
64. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 49, at 127.
65. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 103 (codified at I.R.C. § 221 (1982)).
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The Ways and Means Committee statement was much more
elaborate, grounding its adoption of the unlimited marital deduc-
tion on something it referred to as the "widow's tax."6 6 The Com-
mittee claimed the widow's tax results when a decedent bequeaths
his entire estate to his surviving spouse.6 7 Half the estate is subject
to tax and, when the surviving spouse later transfers the property,
the entire amount is subject to estate taxes. Thus, the cumulative
effect of this form of transfer is to subject the property of a hus-
band and wife to tax one and one-half times. This result is said to
occur frequently in the case of jointly held property. As this addi-
tional tax falls "most heavily on widows, it is often referred to as
the 'widow's tax'."68 The Committee recognized that this addi-
tional tax can be minimized through proper estate planning, but
stated that it believed that an individual should be free to pass his
entire estate to his surviving spouse without the imposition of any
additional tax. The Committee also found it appropriate to permit
unlimited lifetime tax-free transfers between spouses as well: "A
substantial simplification of the estate and gift taxes would be
achieved by allowing an unlimited marital deduction since, under
present law, it is difficult to determine the ownership of property
held by a marital unit and to determine whose funds were used to
acquire that property."6 "
3. Should one use the unlimited estate tax marital deduc-
tion? Initially, one's reaction to the unlimited marital deduction is
that its use depends upon the length of time by which the surviv-
ing spouse will survive the decedent.70 The basis for this reaction is
66. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 159.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 159-60.
70. See generally Garlock, Estate Tax Unlimited Marital Deduction Has Limited Ad-
vantage In Larger Estates, 56 J. TAX'N 236 (1982). Garlock notes the following reasons for
using the unlimited marital deduction:
1. Because the top estate tax rate will not fall to 50% until 1985, the use of the
unlimited marital deduction may allow the entire combined estate to benefit
from a lower maximum rate.
2. Passing. all of the property to the surviving spouse may enable him or her to
transfer additional assets to children and grandchildren free of tax by making
annual gifts, or perhaps gifts to charity.
3. A third reason has been offered-the burden of any extra total estate tax paya-
ble will be more than offset by deferring all of the tax until the death of the
survivor. The thrust of the article is that this reason is not valid, especially in
the case of couples living in states with significant death taxes which do not
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that an estate tax is not paid at the death of the first spouse where
the unlimited marital deduction is used, but will be collected on all
of the property at the date of the second spouse's death. However,
the estate of the second to die will in most instances be in a higher
bracket than would have been the case had half the property been
taxed in the estate of the first to die and half in the estate of the
second. Since more tax will be paid through the use of the unlim-
ited marital deduction, the issue is how long it would take for the
interest on the earlier saved tax to exceed the additional tax paya-
ble on the estate of the second to die.
In fact, as is demonstrated by Charts 2 and 3 below, the eco-
nomics of the situation are not a significant factor, in part because
of the reduction of the top rate to 50% and the increase in unified
credit. Moreover, as will be seen from the following discussion,
there are many economic factors to be weighed in determining
whether the unlimited marital deduction should be elected. Chart
2 computes the tax that would be imposed in 1987 and thereafter
on the estates of both husband and wife under three alternative
dispositions: when the 50% marital deduction is taken, when the
100% marital deduction is taken, and when the 100% marital de-
duction is taken but $600,000 is retained in the first estate. This
chart demonstrates that either of the second two dispositions of
property causes a somewhat higher tax to be paid than the use of
the 50% marital deduction, although the extra tax can be signifi-
cantly reduced if $600,000 is retained in the first estate so that the
full amount of the unified credit of the first to die is utilized. Chart
3 builds on Chart 2 and computes the approximate period that
would be necessary to earn an amount equivalent to the additional
tax, assuming a 10% simple rate of return, both where the 100%
marital deduction is used and where the 100% marital deduction is
used but $600,000 is retained in the estate of the first to die. Of
course, it should be remembered that $600,000 plus the deductible
costs of administration is realistically the minimum amount to
leave in the first estate.
As Chart 3 demonstrates, there are strong economic con-
straints in favor of the use of the unlimited marital deduction
where the estate planner avails himself of the unified credit in the
allow an unlimited marital deduction.
Id. at 236.
822 [Vol. 31
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
estate of the first to die. On examining Chart 3, it can be observed
that if the unlimited marital deduction is used without retaining
$600,000 in the estate of the first to die, there are strong economic
constraints against the use of the unlimited marital deduction in
estates of less than $5,000,000, but extremely strong economic con-
straints in favor of the use of the unlimited marital deduction in
estates of greater than $5,000,000. On the other hand, where one
takes proper advantage of the unified credit in the estate of the
first to die, Chart 3 demonstrates that there are relatively strong
economic constraints in favor of the use of the unlimited marital
deduction in every size estate.
CHART 2



























































Chart 2 computes the tax which would be imposed on various sizes
of estates ranging from $1,200,000 to $20,000,000 where the 50%




















elected, and where the 100% marital deduction is coupled with
$600,000 retained in the estate of the first to die. The assumption
in every case is that all of the marital property is held by the first
to die and that there is no appreciation, depreciation, or disposi-
tion of property by the surviving spouse during his or her lifetime.
Expenses of administration are ignored. It is further assumed that
the $600,000 subjected to tax in the first decedent's estate is left to
the surviving spouse in a form subject to tax in her estate. This
assumption facilitates the comparisons to be made, however, as a
practical matter it may be unrealistic. First, the survivor may not
need the $600,000, or if needed, it could be made available to trust
and thus pass free of estate tax on the survivor's death. Second,
the $600,000 may have to be used to pay state death taxes or other
expenses.
For example, in the case of an estate of $2,500,000, column (2),
the 50% marital deduction column, is based on the assumption
that $1,250,000 will be taxed in the estate of the first to die and
$1,250,000 will be taxed in the estate of the second to die. Column
(2) gives the total tax that would be imposed after the use of the
unified credit in both estates. The tax set forth in column (3) is the
tax that would be im'osed on an estate of $2,500,000, the assump-
tion being that there was no estate tax imposed in the case of the
first to die so that the full $2,500,000 becomes taxable in the estate
of the second to die.
The first observation that will be made on examination of
Chart 2 is that the additional tax liability incurred where the un-
limited marital deduction elected is not that much different, irre-
spective of the size of the estate. For example, in an estate of
$2,000,000 an additional $282,000 will be paid where the unlimited
marital deduction is taken. On the other hand, in estates of
$5,000,000, $10,000,000, and $20,000,000, the additional tax is only
$417,000. Essentially the same is true where $600,000 is retained in
the estate of the first to die, although the additional tax is signifi-
cantly reduced. For example, in an estate of $2,000,000 the addi-
tional tax through the use of the 100% marital deduction is only
$14,000, and in estates of $5,000,000 and above it is only $117,000.
As can be seen by examining Chart 2, where the planner does
not avail himself of the first decedent's unlimited credit, the use of
the unlimited marital deduction is uneconomical for small estates
but is economically required for larger estates. In the case of an
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estate of $1,200,000, where there will be no tax whatsoever if a
50% marital deduction is taken (as the unified credit would elimi-
nate the $600,000 estate of the first to die as well as the $600,000
estate of the second to die), there will be a $235,000 tax where the
unlimited marital deduction is taken. This $235,000 can never be
recouped by earnings on the tax saved in the first estate. In such a
case there is only one credit available and that is in the estate of
the second to die. Yet in a large estate, say of $10,000,000, the ad-
ditional tax is only $417,000 and is recouped in two years from in-
vested tax savings.
By the same token, Chart 2 indicates that where the planner
does avail himself of the first decedent's unlimited credit, the use
of the unlimited marital deduction cannot be regarded as expen-
sive and in most cases will produce a substantial advantage if the
surviving spouse lives for any significant period. This assumes, of
course, that the taxes which are not paid on the first estate are
appropriately invested, and not spent. For example, in the case of
a $1,200,000 estate where $600,000 is retained in the estate of the
first to die, one gets exactly the same result from a 100% marital
deduction as where the 50% marital deduction is taken. The uni-
fied credit would eliminate the $600,000 in the estate of the first to
die, as well as the balance in the estate of the second to die. In the
case of estates of $5,000,000, $10,000,000, and $20,000,000, the dis-
advantage of $117,000 is easily recouped in a relatively short pe-
riod, as shown in Chart 3.
CHART 3
APPROXIMATE PERIOD AT 10% SIMPLE RATE OF RETURN
TO PAY FOR 100% MARITAL DEDUCTION
Without Retention of $600,000 in First Estate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Additional
Size of Tax from 100% Tax Saved in Earnings Approximate
Estate Deduction First Estate Per Year Period
$20,000,000 $417,000 $4,583,000 $458,300 11 mos.
$10,000,000 $417,000 $2,083,000 $208,300 2 yrs.
$ 5,000,000 $417,000 $ 833,000 $ 83,300 5 yrs.
$ 2,500,000 $322,000 $ 255,500 $ 25,550 12 yrs., 7 mos.
$ 2,000,000 $282,000 $ 153,000 $ 15,300 18 yrs., 5 mos.
$ 1,200,000 $235,000 $ 0 $ 0 never
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With Retention of $600,000 in First Estate
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Additional
Size of Tax from 100% Tax Saved in Earnings Approximate
Estate Deduction First Estate Per Year Period
$20,000,000 $117,000 $4,583,000 $458,300 3 mos.
$10,000,000 $117,000 $2,083,000 $208,300 7 mos.
$ 5,000,000 $117,000 $ 833,000 $ 83,300 1 yr., 5 mos.
$ 2,500,000 $ 32,000 $ 255,500 $ 25,550 1 yr., 3 mos.
$ 2,000,000 $ 14,000 $ 153,000 $ 15,300 11 mos.
$ 1,200,000 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 never
Chart 3 assumes that the additional tax which would be paid in
the estate of the first to die is invested at 10%. Ten percent seems
like a moderate assumption for the present day, since one may
achieve nearly that rate of return in tax-exempt bonds, thus elimi-
nating the effects of taxes from consideration. Even if rates drop
and it is assumed that taxable investments are made, the conclu-
sions demonstrated by Chart 3 will not change substantially. Chart
3 reflects the same size of estates the taxes of which were calcu-
lated both on a 50% and a 100% basis in Chart 2. Column (2)
gives the additional tax liability which would be incurred as a re-
sult of the use of the unlimited marital deduction and column (3)
gives the amount of tax which would be saved in the first estate by
the election of the unlimited marital deduction. Column (4) then
shows the earnings per year, at 10%, on the tax saved. Column (5)
gives the approximate period of time that will be necessary for the
estate tax saved by the use of the unlimited marital deduction to
return an amount equal to the subsequent additional tax which
will be imposed by its use. At the $2,000,000 estate level, nearly
nineteen years is necessary to achieve an economic pay-back from
the election of the marital deduction, whereas at $10,000,000 only a
year and one-half is necessary, and at $20,000,000 eight months is
all that is required. As should be obvious, where one has an estate
of $1,200,000, the unlimited marital deduction is never economical,
for no tax is saved in the first estate electing 100% marital deduc-
tion as no tax would have been payable had the 50% deduction
been taken.
Columns (6) through (10) present the same data where the
planner is wise enough to couple the use of the unlimited marital
deduction with the use of the first decedent's unified credit. Here
the economic constraint is entirely different and almost requires
the use of the 100% marital deduction if economic factors are
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paramount. In the case of a $20,000,000 estate, survival for only
three months is necessary to offset the additional tax and at
$5,000,000 where the period is the longest, a year and five months
is sufficient. Even in cases where both spouses are elderly and the
period of survival for the surviving spouse may be assumed to be
minimal, the pay-back period is so short that use of the unlimited
marital deduction seems mandated if economics are the sole
consideration.
When analyzing the advisability of using the unlimited marital
deduction, one should also consider the situation where the surviv-
ing spouse has significant property of his or her own. Interestingly
enough, Chart 4 demonstrates that there is little change where that
is the case.
Chart 4 was constructed on the following basis, using the same
estate sizes that have been used in the prior charts: It assumes that
the husband is the propertied spouse with 75% of the couple's
property and that the husband elects to use an equalizing marital
deduction clause. That is, for example, where his estate is
$15,000,000 and his wife's estate is $5,000,000, the marital bequest
is in the amount of $5,000,000. Therefore, the estate of the first to
die is $10,000,000 if an equal amount is in the estate of the second
to die. The total tax on both estates is shown in column (3). Col-
umn (4) shows the total amount of tax that would be paid in both
estates where the unlimited marital deduction is utilized, but it is
assumed that $600,000 is retained in the estate of the first to die.
Column (5) shows the additional tax from the use of the unlimited
marital deduction.
CHART 4
TAXES AT 1987 RATES ON ESTATES OF BOTH SPOUSES IN ALTERNATIVE
DISPOSITIONS WHERE BOTH SPOUSES HAVE ASSETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Additional
Equalizing 100% Tax from
Size of Size of Marital Marital Marital
H's Estate W's Estate Deduction Deduction Deduction
Total Tax Total Tax









$ 3,700,000 $1,250,000 $1,666,000 $1,783,000 $117,000
$ 1,875,000 $ 625,000 $ 511,000 $ 543,000 $ 32,000
$ 1,500,000 $ 500,000 $ 306,000 $ 320,000 $ 14,000
$ 900,000 $ 300,000 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
In estates of $5,000,000, $10,000,000, and $20,000,000, the addi-
tional tax cost is exactly the same as in the case where the surviv-
ing spouse did not have property-117,000. Essentially, the num-
bers are comparable. In Chart 2, a total estate of $2,500,000
produces a future additional tax of $32,000 through the use of the
unlimited marital deduction. In Chart 4, a $2,500,000 estate pos-
sessed by both husband and wife produces the same additional
$32,000 cost for the use of the unlimited marital deduction as the
use of an equalizing marital deduction clause.
The foregoing analysis, which suggests that the unlimited mar-
ital deduction should almost always be elected, is somewhat dis-
torted by its assumption that there is no appreciation and that any
earnings are spent. A slightly different picture emerges if it is as-
sumed that earnings are accumulated or that there is appreciation.
In such a case the unlimited marital deduction becomes slightly
disadvantageous. This is true because less of the augmented value
will be subject to estate tax on the death of the surviving spouse if
the 50% marital deduction is elected.
Assume a $5,000,000 estate, a 10% interest or growth factor,
either a 50% or a 100% marital deduction (in the latter case, with
$600,000 retained in the first decedent's estate), and that it is 1987
so the full benefit of reduced rates and the maximum unified credit
is available. Further assume the surviving spouse lives ten years.
There is an advantage to a 50% marital deduction if one alters
one's focus.7 1 As Chart 5 calculates, on these assumptions $234,000
more will be available to the successor at the death of the surviving
spouse in 1987 if the 50% marital deduction rather than the 100%
marital deduction is elected by the first decedent.
71. Id. at 236-41.
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CHART 5
1987 AND 1997 TAXES IN ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS
WHEN GROWTH IS CONSIDERED
50% Marital 100% Marital
1987 H's Estate $5,000,000 $5,000,000
Marital Deduction 2,500,000 4,400,000
H's Taxable Estate $2,500,000 $600,000
Tax on H's Estate After Unified Credit 833,000 0
Marital Portion $2,500,000 $4,400,000
Successor's Portion $1,667,000 $ 600,000
1997 Marital Portion $2,500,000 $4,400,000
Assumed Growth on Marital Portion 2,500,000 4,400,000
W's Estate $5,000,000 $8,800,000
Marital Deduction 0 0
W's Taxable Estate $5,000,000 $8,800,000
Tax on W's Estate After Unified Credit 2,083,000 3,983,000
Net to Survivors $2,917,000 $4,817,000
Successor's Portion of H's Estate $1,667,000 $ 600,000
Assumed Growth on Successor's
Portion of H's Estate 1,667,000 600,000
Total to Successors $6,251,000 $6,017,000
As a practical matter, it seems likely that decedents will, and per-
haps properly should, focus on the immediate tax and interest ad-
vantage of electing the 100% marital deduction and downplay the
overall economic gain that could result to the family unit many
years in the future as a result of a 50% marital deduction election.
Furthermore, in considering whether to elect the 100% marital de-
duction as opposed to the 50% marital deduction, one must bear
in mind the possibility of using life insurance to fund the estate
tax payable on the second death. A recently developed life insur-
ance contract, generally referred to as survivorship whole life in-
surance, is particularly suitable for this purpose. Simply described,
a survivorship whole life insurance policy insures the lives of two
persons and the proceeds are payable on the second death. Al-
though the concept is intriguing and the policy itself is capable of
producing extremely dramatic results in a variety of areas, one par-
ticular use would be in connection with the election of the 100%
marital deduction. The policy would provide the funds to pay the
tax on the survivor's death, permitting the estate to pass largely or
totally estate-tax-free.
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There are several features of this particular contract which
makes it particularly attractive. First, two lives are insured in one
policy. The proceeds are payable on the second death, and the or-
der of death (such as husband first, wife second) is not relevant.
Second, this policy can be acquired for a significantly lesser
amount (in some cases up to 50%) than the cost to insure a single
life or the premium for separate policies on two lives. In addition
to premium cost considerations, this policy can be designed so as
to produce a net after-tax cost, over the entire period the policy is
in force, of an amount as little as twice the annual premium. For
example, assume that a male aged fifty-nine and a female aged
fifty-four are jointly insured. Using maximum leverage, a cumula-
tive net after-tax cost or outlay of $37,500 made over seven years
will provide a minimum of $1,000,000 upon the second death. This
is an extraordinary return on invested assets when viewed from
any perspective.
In contrast to these results, flower bonds 2 are frequently pur-
chased to provide a significant discount on the payment of estate
taxes. A bond with a face value of $1,000 which had been pur-
chased for $750 could be turned in to discharge a $1,000 estate tax
liability thus providing, in effect, a 25% discount on the payment
of estate taxes. However, by utilizing survivorship whole life insur-
ance, as much as a 96% discount on the amounts necessary to dis-
charge estate taxes or other estate settlement costs is attained. By
combining survivorship whole life insurance with the election of
the 100% marital deduction, one may, with a limited expenditure,
largely eliminate the burden of estate taxes from the transmission
of property from an older generation to the younger generation.
4. State death tax considerations. In considering the use of
the unlimited marital deduction, attention must be given to the
impact of state taxation as to whether the full estate can pass fed-
eral estate-tax-free even though the unlimited marital deduction is
claimed. This is a problem only in the very largest estates, because
only then will the $600,000 left in the first decedent's estate be
inadequate to pay the state tax.
72. Flower bonds are certain United States bonds which provide that they may be
turned in at par value in payment of estate taxes. These bonds have a low interest rate and
therefore sell at a considerable discount. Thus, a substantial advantage is obtained if a dece-
dent, shortly before his demise, acquires flower bonds which are then used for the payment
of estate taxes. Bonds of this type are no longer issued, but prior issues are still outstanding.
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By way of example, consider the situation existing in New
York prior to October 1, 1983.71 New York law presently provides
for estate tax deductions for a resident's estate equal to the deduc-
tions from his federal gross estate allowable in determining his fed-
eral estate tax under the Internal Revenue Code, with certain mi-
nor adjustments. However, the marital deduction is limited to 50%
of the adjusted gross estate until October 1, 1983.7 Thus, a 100%
marital deduction for federal purposes will not eliminate the New
York tax for decedents dying prior to October 1, 1983. Alterna-
tively, assume one lives in New Jersey, which has an inheritance
tax law that makes no provision for a marital deduction. 5 In either
case the decedent, although exempt from federal tax, will not be
exempt from state tax. To the extent that state death taxes must
be paid, they reduce the amount of the federal marital deduction
unless paid from the $600,000 retained. State death taxes must be
paid from funds not sheltered by the marital deduction, since the
73. New York State on December 19, 1982, amended its estate and gift tax laws to
adopt the federal estate and gift tax provisions in effect on September 3, 1982. See 1982
N.Y. Laws chs. 916 & 917. The unlimited marital deduction was adopted, but only so as to
take effect for decedents dying after September 30, 1983, and for gifts made after that date.
This legislation included the following changes effective January 1, 1983:
(1) Estate and gift tax rates are made the same.
(2) Lifetime transfers are added to transfers made at death for estate tax pur-
poses, and any gift tax paid offsets the estate tax so computed.
(3) The per donee exclusion is increased to $10,000 ($20,000 for joint gifts by
married couples).
Id. See generally Blattmachr, N.Y. Conforms to U.S. Rules For Estate & Gift Taxes, 188
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
74. The New York statute, in my view, leaves something to be desired in the way of
clarity. Until October 1, 1983, it limits a New York decedent to a 50% marital deduction.
Section 955 provides that the New York estate tax deductions for an estate of a deceased
resident mean the deductions "from his federal gross estate allowable in determining his
federal taxable estate," adjusted as provided in §§ 956 and 957. The adjustments in § 956,
according to the title, relate to modifications for real and tangible personal property outside
of New York State which are not subject to New York estate tax. Section 957 deals with a
modification for limited powers of appointment created prior to September 1, 1935. Thus, it
would seem that any increase in the federal marital deduction would result in an increase in
a New York State marital deduction. However, buried in § 956, the section headed "Modifi-
cations for Real and Tangible Personal Property Outside New York State," is a provision
limiting the marital deduction for New York purposes to that allowable for federal tax pur-
poses as was specified in the Revenue Act of 1976. That is, the New York State marital
deduction shall in no event exceed the greater of $250,000 (reduced by the gift tax adjust-
ment) or 50% of the amount by which the value of the New York gross estate exceeds the
aggregate amount of certain deductions and other adjustments. See N.Y. TAX LAw §§
955(a), 956, 957 (McKinney 1982).
75. N.J. REv. STAT. § 54.34-5 (1935).
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amount paid in taxes will not be transferred to the surviving
spouse. Therefore, as state death taxes increase, the marital deduc-
tion for federal purposes is reduced; as the federal marital deduc-
tion is reduced, federal tax liability increases.
At most levels the average state death tax will be less than
$600,000 and can be funded without invasion of the marital share.
In those cases where the state tax will be greater than $600,000,
there appear to be two ways to approach this problem. One could
modify the clause leaving property in the estate of the decedent to
add an amount sufficient to discharge the estate's obligation for
state death taxes to the $600,000 and the allowance for administra-
tive expenses retained. Alternatively, one could provide that state
death taxes be paid from the marital share. From the standpoint of
the marital deduction, either technique has exactly the same re-
sult. The payment to the surviving spouse, and therefore the mari-
tal deduction, is reduced by the amount of state death taxes paid.
Accordingly, a federal tax liability is necessarily incurred in the de-
cedent's estate as a result of the reduction in the marital deduc-
tion. In either event, it appears that algebraic computations will
not be necessary to determine the amount of the marital deduc-
tion. Presumably the problem will arise because only a 50% mari-
tal deduction or less is allowed for state purposes. If so, the federal
tax paid will not reduce the state marital deduction, only the fed-
eral, as the federal tax cannot exceed half the adjusted gross
estate.
Chart 6 below sets forth the marital deduction which will be
permitted in an estate for state tax purposes where the marital de-
duction is limited to half the adjusted gross estate, the state death
taxes imposed are New York rates,7 6 and deductions other than the
marital deduction are ignored. Chart 6 assumes that the $600,000
subject to tax to use up the credit is used to pay the state tax and
it estimates the additional federal liability resulting from the pay-
ment of the excess state taxes from the marital deduction.
76. N.Y. TAx LAW § 952(a) (McKinney 1975).
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State State Taxes in Resulting
Size of Marital Death Excess of Federal
Estate Deduction Taxes $600,000 Tax
$20,000,000 $10,000,000 $1,437,000 $837,000 $418,000
$10,000,000 $ 5,000,000 $ 542,000 $ 0 $ 0
$ 5,000,000 $ 2,500,000 $ 201,000 $ 0 $ 0
$ 2,500,000 $ 1,250,000 $ 75,000 $ 0 $ 0
$ 2,000,000 $ 1,000,000 $ 53,000 $ 0 $ 0
$ 1,200,000 $ 600,000 $ 26,000 $ 0 $ 0
A New York gross estate of about $10,740,000 (before a 50% state
marital deduction) is required before there is a greater than
$600,000 New York State estate tax.
5. Should estates be equalized? In the past, looking at tax
factors alone, estate lawyers have generally counseled the equaliza-
tion of estates. That is, assuming that the husband held the bulk
of the couple's property in his name, he would be advised to trans-
fer property to the wife to the extent this could be done tax-free
until she held approximately half of the property. The purpose of
equalization was to provide a tax benefit should the spouse without
property be the first to die. If the spouse with property was the
first to die, the estate could be effectively split in half by using the
standard A-B trust formula," with the A trust eligible for the mar-
ital deduction and the B trust excludible from the wife's estate.
Thus, where the taxable estate was, let us say, $10,000,000,
$5,000,000 would be taxed when the husband died and $5,000,000
would be taxed when the wife died, thus bringing about the lowest
possible estate tax burden. On the other hand, without equaliza-
tion, if the propertyless wife died first, there would be no tax on
77. For many years, a standard will drafting technique has been to establish for the
benefit of the surviving spouse a so-called "A" trust, a trust eligible for the marital deduc-
tion, and a so-called "B" trust. Under the A trust the surviving spouse would have an in-
come interest and a power of appointment. It would be includable in the surviving spouse's
estate. Under the B trust, the income would be payable to the surviving spouse for life (with
a liberal power of invasion), but with the remainder interest vested in the children or others
so that the B trust was excludable from the surviving spouse's estate. This system effec-
tively provides the surviving spouse with income from all of the decedents property and
substantial dominion over both the A trust and the B trust. However, only the A trust, and
not the B trust, would be includable in the surviving spouse's estate.
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her estate; possibly even her lifetime credit would go unutilized.
Moreover, unless the surviving husband married again, his estate
would be subject to tax at higher rates since he would not be able
to avail himself of a marital deduction, his wife having predeceased
him.
The question of equalization must be reexamined now that an
unlimited marital deduction is available for both estate and gift
tax purposes. This makes it possible to equalize estates immedi-
ately by lifetime transfers. The question remains, however, as to
whether equalization is desirable. For example, consider the pro-
spective decedent with a $20,000,000 estate. If he transfers half the
property to his wife, he will die with a $10,000,000 estate which
presumably he will pass to the objects of their joint bounty, possi-
bly with an income interest to the surviving spouse for life. Yet he
may achieve precisely this same result in his will by availing him-
self of the 50% marital deduction. Alternatively, as was pointed
out above, if he avails himself of the unlimited marital deduction
except to the extent of $600,000, it will almost certainly prove ad-
vantageous, inasmuch as the $117,000 additional tax cost will al-
most surely be made up by the interest savings in the postpone-
ment of the tax from the time of his death until the time of his
spouse's death. Therefore, assuming that the possessor of the prop-
erty will be the first to die, equalization does not seem to be
significant.
Fate being what it is, however, one cannot always be certain
that the first decedent will be the spouse with property. If the
spouse with property does not make any equalizing transfers and
his spouse dies first, his estate will bear an additional $417,000 in
tax. It will be taxed on the same basis that the spouse would have
been taxed had the 100% marital deduction been utilized and no
provision made to retain $600,000 to use the unified credit. The
tax imposed will exceed by $417,000 the tax that would have been
imposed had the estate been divided into two $10,000,000 portions,
each subject to tax and the use of the unified credit. It can be said
that from this viewpoint there is some advantage to equalization.
On the other hand, one may question whether a tax savings of
$417,000 at some time in the future is sufficient to justify the im-
mediate disposition of property to another, subjecting it to the
hazards that such a course of action necessarily presents. Further-
more, one can reduce the tax disadvantage to $117,000 in such a
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case by the transfer of only $600,000 to obtain the advantage of
another unified credit.
In considering this problem, it is important to keep in mind
the change Congress made with respect to qualified terminable in-
terest property. As will be noted below, the use of this new form of
disposition permits one to utilize the 100% marital deduction for
either estate or gift tax purposes without surrendering the right to
control the disposition of the property at the death of the surviv-
ing spouse. In light of the economic advantages of the unlimited
marital deduction, one may expect the new qualified terminable
interest property provisions of section 2056(d) to be frequently uti-
lized to permit the 100% marital deduction to be taken without
surrendering control of the decedent's property to the surviving
spouse. Thus, equalizing estates-more likely passing enough prop-
erty to the propertyless spouse to permit the payment of estate
expenses and full use of the unified credit-is greatly facilitated by
the existence of qualified terminable interest property.
Consider the matter now from the standpoint of the more
moderate estate, say $2,500,000. Assuming that the possessor of
property can be assured of being the first to die, there is little ad-
vantage to lifetime transfers. On the other hand, if a lifetime divi-
sion is not made and the surviving spouse is the one with the prop-
erty, an additional tax of $322,000 will be imposed as a result of
the higher rates and the loss of the use of one unified credit. If
$600,000 were transferred to the non-propertied spouse, the addi-
tional tax to be imposed on both estates would be only $32,000.
This amount of additional tax is so small that further equalization
seems unwise in light of nontax disadvantages.
It appears that equalization of estates is somewhat more
pressing with respect to estates at lower monetary levels than es-
tates at higher levels. Although the tax penalty for not equalizing
is smaller in absolute dollar terms, it is a larger percentage of the
estate. Moreover, at all levels, once the less propertied spouse has
sufficient assets to utilize the unified credit in full, the nontax dis-
advantages of a transfer of property probably outweigh the poten-
tial tax savings to be derived from equalization.
6. The use of an equalization clause. It appears that equali-
zation clauses may be used somewhat more often in the future. An
equalization clause, a sample of which is set forth in the footnote
below, is a clause which alters the marital bequest if the spouses
1982l 835
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die within six months of each other, so that the parties' property is
placed half in the estate of the first to die and half in the estate of
the second to die. 8 Under the old law,79 it may have been desirable
to use the maximum 50% marital deduction if a spouse had prop-
erty, even though this would increase somewhat the tax in the es-
tate of the surviving spouse, because of the property she or he al-
ready possessed. On the other hand, where the surviving spouse
dies in a common disaster or shortly after the first death, any ad-
vantage from a full 50% deduction is lost. Accordingly, equaliza-
tion clauses were developed to reduce the marital bequest so as to
equalize the amounts of the estates and thus produce the lowest
possible tax. While there was some controversy concerning the
question of whether the use of an equalization clause resulted in a
terminable interest, that controversy has now been properly re-
solved-such a clause does not result in a terminable interest.80
Consider now an equalization clause in the context of the use
of the 100% marital deduction. As has been demonstrated, the use
of the unlimited marital deduction combined with the retention of
$600,000 in the first estate will produce an additional tax of no
more than $117,000 in the estate of the second to die. As pointed
out above, this amount can usually be earned in a comparatively
short period by appropriate investment of the tax that would oth-
erwise be paid by the estate of the first to die. However, if the
spouse who was expected to survive instead dies in a common dis-
aster with the decedent, or dies shortly thereafter, there will be no
opportunity to earn the necessary income from the tax savings in
the estate of the first to die. Therefore, one might well wish to
revert to either a 50% deduction, if it is assumed that the briefly
surviving spouse has no assets, or to a balancing of the two estates
in a situation where the briefly surviving spouse has some
78. For example, "If my wife and I shall die simultaneously or under such circum-
stances as to make it impossible or difficult to determine who predeceased the other, I
hereby declare it to be my will that it so be deemed conclusively that my wife survived me
and the above provisions of this Article shall be construed and given effect on the assump-
tion and basis that my wife survived me. However, in such a case, or if my wife should die
within six months of the date of my death, I direct that the principal of the Trust created
under this Article shall be further reduced in such event so that the total value of the ad-
justed gross estate of my said wife, including said principal as reduced, shall be equal to the
total value of my adjusted gross estate, excluding said principal as reduced."
79. I.R.C. § 2056 (1976) (amended by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(a)).
80. See Rev. Rul. 82-23, 1982-1 C.B. 139 (agreeing to follow the cases holding that the
use of an equalization clause does not result in a nondeductible terminable interest).
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property.
Admittedly, the stakes are relatively small here inasmuch as
the maximum detriment in estates of over $5,000,000 is $117,000,
hardly a princely sum all things considered. In the case of a
$20,000,000 estate where, as Chart 3 demonstrates, survival for
three months is sufficient to recoup the additional cost, an equali-
zation clause cannot be regarded as terribly important. On the
other hand, there is no particular disadvantage to using an equali-
zation clause, and savings can be realized. It can be reasonably as-
sumed that in a $20,000,000 estate one might consider reducing the
six month period (the maximum allowed in equalization clauses) to
three months, inasmuch as that is the break-even point. At
$10,000,000 and below, where it is estimated that seven months or
more would be required to earn the additional tax cost, a six-
month clause would seem to be appropriate.
7. Handling of administration expenses. Under present law,
one aspect of post-mortem estate planning which is well recognized
is an election by the executor to deduct expenses either for estate
tax purposes, or, providing the appropriate waiver is filed under
section 642(g), for income tax purposes against the income of the
estate. In most instances, the choice is an obvious one as the exec-
utor determines where the deduction will provide the greatest tax
benefit. An estate in the 50% estate tax bracket and only the 20%
income tax bracket would be better off taking the deduction for
estate tax purposes. There are a number of collateral consequences
of this election which must be considered, but they are beyond the
scope of this Article. For example, the use of these expenses for
income tax purposes will have the effect of increasing a marital
deduction which is based on a formula clause using the adjusted
gross estate, since the adjusted gross estate is determined by sub-
tracting from the gross estate only those expenses which are al-
lowed (as distinguished from allowable) for estate tax purposes.
The general considerations which have ordinarily governed in
the past, however, need to be re-examined where the 100% marital
deduction has been elected. It might be thought that in every case
where the 100% marital deduction is claimed administration ex-
penses will now be claimed for income tax purposes. By definition,
one thinks of the unlimited marital deduction as eliminating any
estate tax, so that any deduction of administration expenses would
produce no estate tax savings, whereas, no matter how little in-
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come an estate may have, it will have some income where the ex-
penses may be put to use. In the ordinary situation this analysis is
sound, and in most cases administration expenses should be
claimed for income tax purposes.
On the other hand, there are situations where such an election
may not be wise. This will be particularly true as the unified credit
is phased-in. For example, in 1983 when the exemption equivalent
of the unified credit is $275,000, there may be a number of estates
electing the 100% marital deduction which will have deductible
administration expenses in excess of $275,000. In any situation
where the deductible administration expenses are in excess of the
amount protected by the unified credit, the treatment of adminis-
tration expenses as income tax deductions will have the effect of
producing an estate tax despite the election of the unlimited mari-
tal deduction.
The reason for this is obvious upon reflection. Administration
expenses, wherever deducted, are paid from the estate. The marital
deduction can never exceed the amount actually available to be
transferred to the surviving spouse. If the expenses are less than
the amount protected by the unified credit, they can be paid from
the amount protected by the credit without impacting upon the
amount passing to the surviving spouse, and be available for the
unlimited marital deduction. In such a case, the combination of
the unlimited marital deduction and the unified credit negate any
estate tax.
On the other hand, if one assumes that the administration ex-
penses are greater than the amount protected by the unified credit,
the excess over the amount protected by the unified credit must
necessarily come from the amount payable to the surviving spouse.
This reduces the amount payable to the surviving spouse and thus
the amount available for the unlimited marital deduction. This re-
duction in the amount passing to the surviving spouse has a
pyramiding effect on the amount of estate tax which must be paid.
Assume, for example, that the amount passing to the surviving
spouse under an unlimited marital deduction bequest is reduced
by $100,000 as a result of the payment of administration expenses
which are $100,000 in excess of the amount protected by the ex-
emption equivalent of the unified credit. Those expenses are de-
ducted for income tax purposes. The executor will suddenly have a
$100,000 taxable estate-the amount not protected by the unified
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credit nor passing to the surviving spouse, and thus exempt from
tax by reason of the unlimited marital deduction. This amount will
be in the 37% bracket and will produce a tax of $37,000. This
$37,000 tax must necessarily be paid from the amounts otherwise
passing to the surviving spouse as there is no other source of funds
in the estate. The funds represented by the exemption equivalent
have presumably gone to pay administration expenses. Therefore,
the unlimited marital deduction is now reduced by $37,000, which
produces an additional $37,000 subject to tax at 37% or $13,690,
further reducing the amount passing to the surviving spouse and
increasing estate taxes. This pyramiding will, of course, continue in
several more stages, in each case increasing the amount of estate
tax paid and reducing the amount of the unlimited marital
deduction.
The obvious answer in the case above is for the executor to
claim the first $275,000 of administration expenses for income tax
purposes, thus producing an income tax savings, and claim the re-
maining $100,000 as a deduction for estate tax purposes. The es-
tate tax deduction of $100,000 will then negate the $100,000 of tax-
able estate which otherwise would be subject to tax and produce a
zero estate tax.
There is another point which must be considered in this con-
nection. Assume that the executor makes a careful analysis of the
situation and concludes that the income tax savings from taking
the extra $100,000 of expenses will be greater than the additional
estate tax cost of claiming those expenses for income tax purposes,
even with pyramiding. In view of the reduction in top rates to 50%
and the fact that the estate tax rates begin at 37%, it is probably
an unusual situation where this question will present itself to any
significant degree. However, in such a situation, there is an addi-
tional complication in electing to take the expenses for income tax
purposes to obtain the greater tax savings. The income tax savings
will redound to the surviving spouse who, by definition, is the re-
cipient of a 100% marital deduction bequest and will be entitled to
the estate income. On the other hand, the additional estate tax
which will be paid-though less than the income tax savings-will
be a charge to corpus under local law and, therefore, will reduce
the interest of the corpus beneficiaries-the remaindermen of the
100% marital deduction trust. In a situation such as this, section
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11-1.2 of the New York Estate Powers and Trust Law81 requires
that the income beneficiary reimburse the corpus beneficiaries to
the extent of any disadvantage which they suffer by reason of the
election to deduct administration expenses for income rather than
estate tax purposes. This reimbursement, since it flows from in-
come to corpus, would not have the effect of reducing the marital
bequest and, therefore, may be done without any impact on the
estate tax.
Furthermore, in considering the impact of the deduction of ex-
penses for income rather than estate tax purposes, in a situation
where the deduction will have the effect of producing an estate tax,
one must not lose sight of the additional impact on state death
taxes. For example, in a state which adopts the 100% marital de-
duction and bases its tax on the estate as determined for federal
purposes, in the situation described above not only will an addi-
tional federal estate tax be produced by the subtraction of the pay-
ment of administration expenses taken for income tax purpose
from the 100% marital bequest, but there will be an additional
state estate tax cost as well, further reducing the federal marital
deduction.
8. Alternate valuation date election. Another popular post-
mortem estate planning technique which must be re-examined in
light of adoption of the unlimited marital deduction is the alter-
nate valuation date election. Under this election, an executor may
decide to value all of the assets in the estate at death or six months
later (or the date of actual distribution if less than six months fol-
lowing the date of death). In most cases, the date selected will be
the date which will result in the lowest values and in the lowest
amount of estate tax. However, where a particular asset is highly
appreciated and necessarily will be sold, it may be advantageous to
elect a valuation date which produces a greater estate tax in view
of the income tax savings that would arise from having this partic-
ular asset take its value on that valuation date. This sort of elec-
tion presents an interesting question as to whether the heirs who
benefit from the income tax savings resulting from the step-up in
basis, assuming they are different persons, should reimburse the
corpus beneficiaries for the additional estate tax which will occur
81. N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRUST LAW § 11-1.2 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
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as a result of the election of the higher valuation date.82 In the
ordinary situation, it must be recognized that the combination of
the alternate valuation date election and the 100% marital deduc-
tion permits an executor to elect the higher values, thus producing
an income tax savings without any offsetting estate tax cost. How-
ever, as indicated in the discussion below, there are a number of
complications.
Where the 100% marital deduction is elected, there will be no
estate tax payable whether the property is valued at the date of
death or at the alternate valuation date, irrespective of which is
higher and which is lower. Accordingly, the executor is in a posi-
tion to examine the income tax aspects of the valuation date elec-
tion carefully and to determine which valuation date will produce
the greatest income tax savings. Furthermore, even if the income
tax savings will accrue entirely to one group of beneficiaries, there
would appear to be no need for reimbursement inasmuch as the
other group of beneficiaries has suffered no detriment as a result of
the favorable (although higher in value) valuation date election.
It does seem, however, that there can be situations which will
put an executor in an exceedingly difficult position. For example,
assume that son A is left an asset which at date of death has a
value of $200,000, and at the alternate valuation date has a value
of $300,000. Assume also that son B is left an asset which at the
date of death had a value of $300,000 and an alternate valuation
date value of $200,000, and that each son plans to sell his asset. If
the alternate valuation date is elected, the first son will avoid a
capital gains tax on a $100,000 gain, but the second son will not
have the advantage of a $100,000 loss on his sale. Conversely, elec-
tion of date of death values will entitle the second son to his
$100,000 loss, but at a cost of a capital gains tax to his sibling.
Presumably, these are matters which can be resolved by discussion
with the interested parties and perhaps a compensating payment
from one to the other. However, if agreement cannot be reached,
the executor will be forced to make a choice even if it is a choice
which will have only income tax, and not estate tax, significance.
In a 100% marital deduction situation, where the estate'will
be tax-free in any event, there is no particular pressure on the ex-
82. See generally Taggart, Adjustments Required Where Tax Elections Alter Interests
Among Beneficiaries, in PosT MORTEM ESTATE PLANMNG 221-54 (1981).
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ecutor to value property carefully, and this produces other compli-
cations. For example, if the estate is objectively valued at
$2,000,000 at the date of death and objectively valued at
$2,500,000 on the alternate valuation date, may the executor value
the property at $3,000,000 for alternate valuation date purposes
with impunity (looking to the eventual capital gains tax savings)?
One may wonder whether the Internal Revenue Service will be
alert and challenge valuations on nontaxable returns merely be-
cause of the eventual impact that the valuation may have for in-
come tax purposes. One may wonder whether new section 6659,
providing for an additional tax in the case of valuation overstate-
ments for purposes of the income tax, will provide any restraint.
Section 6659 provides in pertinent part that if an individual has an
underpayment of income tax which is attributable to a "valuation
overstatement," then there shall be added to the tax an amount
equal to a defined percentage of the net underpayment. A valua-
tion overstatement results if the value of any property or the ad-
justed basis of any property claimed on any return exceeds 150%
of the amount determined to be the correct valuation or adjusted
basis where the property has been acquired within the last five
years and the underpayment is at least $1,000. The Internal Reve-
nue Service may waive all or any part of the additional tax on a
showing by the taxpayer that there was a reasonable basis for the
valuation or adjusted basis claimed on the return, and that such
claim was made in good faith.
This provision originated in the House and was intended pri-
marily to provide additional protection against abusive tax shel-
ters, although the Ways and Means Committee report does not so
state.8 3 There is nothing which specifically makes this provision in-
applicable to an excessive estate tax valuation to achieve income
tax objectives, but as a practical matter it does not seem that sec-
tion 6659 provides much protection to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice. First, the property must be overvalued by 50% or more, and
it is difficult to imagine an executor, even if a family member, be-
ing so aggressive as to claim that kind of overvaluation on an es-
tate tax return. Certainly, the possibility of claiming a 49% over-
statement without penalty would seem to allow ample room for
maneuver.
83. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 243-44.
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Second, there is additional protection for the heir in a situa-
tion where he was not the executor. There certainly could be a le-
gitimate claim raised by such an heir that he had not made a valu-
ation overstatement when he relied on the amount fixed by the
executor on an estate tax return with respect to which he had no
responsibility. It is difficult to believe that an heir should be re-
quired to determine independently the proper valuation of prop-
erty where that property has been valued for estate tax purposes
by the executor-particularly where any increase in value, even if
it has no federal income tax impact, may well have an impact on
state taxes payable by the estate. Third, the five year holding
period safe harbor and the provision permitting the Internal Reve-
nue Service to waive the additional tax provide further protec-
tion. 4 Certainly a strong claim can be made for a waiver of the
penalty, even if technically applicable, where the heir relied on a
valuation made by the executor and it is shown that he or she was
not privy to any discussions with respect to the advantages of an
excessive valuation for estate tax purpose.
Perhaps the major disadvantage with respect to artificial in-
creases in values on a 100% marital deduction return, whether to
obtain increased depreciation deductions or reduce capital gains
taxes, is the possible impact of that valuation when the second
spouse dies. It is not likely that the courts will be receptive to the
wife's executor claiming that there was a substantial excess valua-
tion in the prior spouse's estate and the proper value for estate tax
purposes is significantly less.
Election of increased values will not have detrimental state es-
tate or inheritance tax impact in those states which do not have an
alternate valuation date. Only in those states which ground their
tax on a federal base will the increased values result in an in-
creased state estate or inheritance tax. Even then, an increase in
84. The value of a property fixed for estate tax purposes is presumptively correct in
determining the basis of the property for income tax purposes, but it can be rebutted. See
Rev. Rul. 54-97, 1954-1 C.B. 113. The taxpayer, however, may be estopped from asserting a
different value. Cf. Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1974) (heir and co-
executor estopped from asserting a higher value at date of death for income tax purposes
than fixed on the estate tax return). But see Chertkof v. United States, 676 F.2d 984 (4th
Cir. 1982) (over Service objections, the mitigation provisions of § 1311 permit reopening a
closed income tax year and recomputing gain on a sale of stock by an estate increasing its




value will result in an increased state death tax credit. In states
which have a tax in addition to the so-called "sponge tax' ' s5 and
use federal alternate valuation date values, there will be an addi-
tional tax cost as a result of such an election.
E. Qualified Terminable Interest Property
1. In general. The House and the Senate agreed that there
should be an unlimited marital deduction. In addition, the House
proposed, and the conference committee ultimately accepted, the
proposition that certain new terminable interest property should
qualify for the marital deduction. 6 If the prescribed standards are
met, one may establish a marital deduction trust for the life of
one's surviving spouse and specify how the property is to pass at
the death of the surviving spouse. This provision has enhanced im-
portance because of the adoption of the unlimited marital deduc-
tion. Such a trust is frequently referred to as a "Q-tip" trust (from
Qualified Terminable Interest Property trust).
The rationale of new section 2056(d) is best understood from
the explanation which is given in the House report and relates to
the desire on the part of the House to provide for control by the
decedent over the property as it passes from the surviving
spouse.8 7 Under present law, as a practical matter, a testator who
wishes to avail himself of the marital deduction must relinquish
control over its subsequent disposition. Such a testator may per-
missibly restrict the surviving spouse from disposing of the prop-
erty in any fashion during the lifetime of the surviving spouse, but
the power to dispose of the property by will must be given to the
surviving spouse. Even in the case of an estate trust under which
there are few restrictions on the nature of the trust (that is, it may
be invested in unproductive property and income may be accumu-
85. A state inheritance or estate tax which is imposed in an amount that will not exceed
the federal credit provided under § 2011 for state death taxes is referred to among tax
practitioners as a "sponge tax." Because of the federal credit for state death taxes, a dece-
dent's estate will pay precisely the same amount of tax whether his state has a death tax or
not, provided the state death tax does not exceed the federal credit. By imposing a tax up to
the amount of the credit, the state obtains revenue which would otherwise pass to the fed-
eral government without any additional burden being imposed on a decedent's estate. Many
states impose a death tax which is limited to the amount necessary to "soak up" the availa-
ble federal credit.
86. S. REP. No. 176, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1981).
87. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 159-60.
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lated rather than paid to the surviving spouse), the surviving
spouse ultimately must be given the power to dispose of the prop-
erty at his or her death.88 This loss of control over property at
death is consistent with the premise underlying the marital deduc-
tion that the property must be subject to tax upon the death of the
surviving spouse. But, with the passage of the 1981 Act, that treat-
ment can be obtained without giving the surviving spouse control
over the disposition of the property.
2. Legislative history. The House report recognized that
under present law a surviving spouse must be given control over
the property to obtain the marital deduction.89 Accordingly, a de-
cedent cannot insure that his or her spouse will subsequently dis-
pose of the property as the decedent would wish. Introduction of
the unlimited marital deduction meant that, if used, the first to die
could not maintain control over even half of his or her property, as
could be done if the 50% marital deduction were elected. The
Ways and Means Committee felt a decedent should not be forced
to choose between surrendering control of an entire estate to avoid
the imposition of an estate tax on death and reducing tax benefits
in order to ensure that the inheritance would pass in a desired
manner on the surviving spouse's death.
3. Qualified terminable interest property and its character-
istics. Under section 2056(b)(7)(B), qualified terminable interest
property is property which passes from the decedent, where the
surviving spouse has a "qualifying income interest" for life in the
property, and an appropriate election is made by the decedent's
executor. Assuming that qualified terminable interest property ex-
ists by reason of the executor's election, section 2044 has been
added to include the value of all qualified terminable interest
property with respect to which a marital deduction was allowed in
88. An estate trust is a trust in which corpus and accumulated income, if any, is made
payable at the wife's death to her estate. Therefore, the wife's interest is not terminable
under § 2056(b)(2), since no one after the wife or her estate will take it. Tress. Reg. §
20.2056(e)-2(b)(2)(ii) (promulgated Sept. 17, 1982). The marital deduction is allowed for the
full value of the trust, not just the value of the wife's income interest since the bequest to
the wife's estate is regarded as a bequest to the wife. As this is not terminable interest
property, none of the requirements of § 2056(b)(5) and the standard marital deduction trust
need to be met. Cf. Rev. Rul. 72-333, 1972-2 C.B. 530 (one may combine an estate trust and
a § 2056(b)(5) trust, as, for example, where the trust provides for income to the wife, for life,
corpus to her estate to the extent it is needed for expenses, with the balance as she appoints
by will).
89. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 160.
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the gross estate of the surviving spouse. Under new section 2519, a
gift tax is imposed if all or part of a qualifying interest is disposed
of during the life of the surviving spouse. Moreover, special provi-
sion has been made with respect to the handling of the estate tax
to be imposed on the death of the surviving spouse.
Section 2055(d) provides that where there is qualified termina-
ble interest property, the property shall be deemed to have passed
to the surviving spouse and no part of the property shall be treated
as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse. There-
fore, although such a bequest is technically terminable interest
property, it has been redefined by Congress as not being termina-
ble interest property and therefore is eligible for the marital de-
duction. To have a qualifying income interest for life, a surviving
spouse must be entitled to all of the income from the property,
payable annually or at more frequent intervals, and there can be
no power to appoint any part of the property to any person other
than the surviving spouse, except to the extent that there is a
power exercisable at or after the death of the surviving spouse. The
requirement that the income be payable annually is consistent
with the requirements of the terminable interest rule contained in
section 2056(b)(5), the provision which qualifies the A trust in the
standard marital A and B trust formulation"' for the marital de-
duction. The House report makes clear that prohibiting the ap-
pointment of the property away from the surviving spouse does not
preclude granting a power to the trustee to invade the corpus for
the benefit of the spouse.91
The surviving spouse must be entitled to the income for a pe-
riod measured solely by the spouse's life, so an income interest
granted for a term of years or a life estate subject to termination
upon remarriage or the occurrence of some event will not be quali-
fied terminable interest property. The House report also states
that the property need not be left in trust, provided that the inter-
est in property provides the spouse with rights to income which
sufficiently satisfy the rules applicable to marital deduction trusts
specified in Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b) through (f).92
90. See supra note 77.
91. H.R. Rep. No. 201, supra note 30, at 161.
92. Id. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b) through (f) (promulgated Sept. 17, 1982). This is an
extremely broad cross-reference, encompassing as it does 27 pages in the version of the es-
tate tax regulations which I have at hand, and neither it, nor any other regulation contains a
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The statute provides that the term "property" for this purpose
includes an interest in property, so that the spouse could be given
a half interest in a patent, for example. However, the surviving
spouse presumably could not be given the decedent's interest in a
term of years (unless the term was clearly longer than the surviv-
ing spouse's life expectancy) or per autre vie.
The statute further provides that the election with respect to
qualified terminable interest property is made by the executor on
the estate tax return of the decedent, and once made is irrevoca-
ble.9 3 The discussion in the House report does not suggest why the
power to elect was granted to the decedent's executor, rather than
to the decedent, exercisable in his will. The provision for an elec-
tion by the executor has both advantages and disadvantages.
First, the advantages. At the time of the filing of the dece-
dent's estate tax return, the precise extent of his estate and the
reasonably precise nature of the surviving spouse's estate will be
known and a determination made as to whether to elect to take
advantage of this provision. Therefore, there is an opportunity to
perform some post-mortem estate planning. However, the eco-
nomic constraints in favor of the use of the unlimited marital de-
duction make this flexibility of little interest as a planning tech-
nique. Nonetheless, qualified terminable interest property will no
doubt frequently be combined with a 100% marital bequest, and
therefore an executor usually will be directed by will to make the
election.
The temporary regulations provide that the election may be
made with respect to a portion of the property otherwise qualifying
as qualified terminable interest property." For example, suppose a
decedent leaves 100% of his property in trust, income to his wife
for life, remainder to their children. This would be qualified termi-
nable interest property should the executor make the appropriate
election. The regulations permit an election to be made with re-
spect to 10% of the trust, 50% of the trust, 70% of the trust, or
section 20.2056(f). The general explanation of ERTA prepared by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, shortens the reference to section 20.2056(b)-5(f), dealing with the right to income
from a trust, a more modest reference. STAFF OF JOINT COMM ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IST.
SEsS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX AcT OF 1981. 235 (Comm.
Print 1981).
93. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) (1982).
94. Tress. Reg. § 22.2056-1(b) (promulgated Sept. 17, 1982).
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any specific portion whether fractional or percentile as, for exam-
ple, is permitted under Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(b). Under
Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(b), in the case of a life estate with
the power of appointment in the surviving spouse, another excep-
tion to the terminable interest rule, a marital deduction is permit-
ted with respect to any specific portion of an interest in property
passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse where that por-
tion meets the requisite conditions, even though there is another
portion of the transfer which does not meet the requisite condi-
tions. The temporary regulations seem to be supported by the stat-
utory provision that a specific portion of property shall be treated
as separate property. 5 It appears that the statute is saying that a
specific portion of property, i.e., 10% of a trust, shall be treated as
separate property and thus can be treated as qualified terminable
interest property.
Additional support for the view that elections with respect to
specific portions are proper is found in the fact that essentially the
same result could be achieved, even if less precisely, if the final
regulations were to require that only an entire interest in the prop-
erty could qualify as qualified terminable interest property. A de-
cedent could, in his last will, create five separate trusts, each with
substantially similar terms, so that the executor could elect with
respect to one or more of the trusts, or even with respect to all five
of the trusts, once a post-mortem analysis of the estates of the two
spouses indicated what was desirable. As was suggested above, only
in the unusual case would less than a 100% election be warranted.
Now the disadvantages. A grant of broad discretion to an exec-
utor on the question of whether or not to elect to have a particular
disposition treated as qualified terminable interest property could
present a problem for an executor. There would appear to be no
conflict between the beneficiaries, unless one visualizes a will in
which the executor has the right not only to elect with respect to a
trust established in the will which was in a form to qualify as qual-
ified terminable interest property, but is also given the right to de-
cide whether or not there shall be such a trust (for example, when-
ever the bequest is to the surviving spouse for life, remainder to
the children). Therefore, whether or not the transfer is treated for
estate tax purposes as eligible for the marital deduction, there will
95. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(iv) (1982).
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not be an increase in the survivor's interest or a decrease in the
interest of the children.
On the other hand, a broad grant of discretion could produce
difficult choices for the executor. Is he to produce the smallest
amount of tax in the first estate, or in both first and second es-
tates? If less than a 100% marital deduction election is made, can
a subsequent change in the value of property on audit by the In-
ternal Revenue Service have the effect of changing the economic
desirability of a particular election? Should that risk be a factor in
an election? As indicated above, ordinarily a testator will indicate
that the election should be made with respect to all of the property
so that the 100% marital deduction is utilized, but, if not, the tes-
tator should provide in his will precisely what considerations the
executor should bear in mind in making the election. Similar rules
are provided with respect to the gift tax, except that the election is
made by the donor rather than by the testator's executor.96
This provision creates a modest dilemma with respect to the
handling of the tax burden in the estate of the surviving spouse.
Assume that the surviving spouse was also a person of means, and
the first spouse to die decided to use this provision and sets up a
trust, income to the surviving spouse for life, remainder to a
younger sister. Under new section 2044, the value of the surviving
spouse's gross estate will include the value of any property for
which a deduction was allowed under section 2056(b)(7) on the
transfer of the property to the decedent (or under section 2523(f),
in the case of a transfer during the decedent's lifetime). This inclu-
sion in the surviving spouse's estate could increase considerably
the taxes to be borne by that estate and reduce the amount of that
estate available for the objects of the second spouse's bounty.
Congress dealt with this problem by the addition of section
2207A. Section 2207A provides a rule which has the effect of avoid-
ing imposition of any additional taxes on the property of the sur-
viving spouse by reason of the inclusion of the qualified terminable
interest property in the estate of the second spouse to die. It im-
poses this additional transfer tax on the recipients of the qualified
terminable interest property. Section 2207A provides that if any
part of the gross estate consists of property which is includable in
the gross estate by reason of section 2044, the estate shall be enti-
96. L.C. § 2523(f) (1982).
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tled to recover the tax from the person receiving that property.
The tax recoverable is the amount by which the total estate tax
which was paid exceeds the tax which would have been payable if
the value of the qualified terminable interest property had not
been included in the gross estate. The second decedent may over-
turn this requirement by will. If there is more than one person re-
ceiving the property, the right of recovery shall be against each
such person, pro rata, in accordance with the amount of his or her
bequest. Similar rules apply in the case of interest and penalties
respecting additional taxes attributable to qualified terminable in-
terest property.
One may raise some questions as to this provision. First, de-
spite the precedent for this provision under sections 2205, 2206,
and 2207, it may be questioned whether Congress has the power to
create such a right of action in an executor. If an executor may not
sue, presumably he would not be permitted to withhold the tax
from the property to be distributed pursuant to the will.
Second, the treatment of penalties and interest would seem to
be debatable. For example, assume an executor collects the appro-
priate tax from those receiving qualified terminable interest prop-
erty, but fails to file a return on time and thus subjects the estate
to interest and penalties. Under the statute it appears that a fur-
ther claim may nonetheless be asserted by the executor against
those receiving qualified terminable interest property for a propor-
tionate share of penalties and interest, even though there was no
conceivable benefit to or responsibility on those persons respecting
the delayed return.
The Ways and Means Committee proposal added section 2519
dealing with the disposition of life estates in qualified terminable
interest property to deal with the possibility that a surviving
spouse might dispose of the income interest during life. This sec-
tion provides that any lifetime disposition of all or part of a quali-
fying income interest for life in any property shall be treated as a
transfer of property and subject to gift tax. Thus, whether the
transfer was originally by gift or by devise, the lifetime disposition
of the life interest by the holder will be treated under the section
as a taxable gift.
Concomitant with this provision, section 2207A provides for
the recovery of any gift tax on such a transfer from the person
receiving the property in the amount by which the total tax for the
[Vol. 31
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
year exceeds the total tax which would have been payable if the
value of such property had not been taken into account. Section
2207A has certain problems. First, the tax is recoverable from the
person who receives the transferred interest. The assumption of
the statute apparently is that the property would be transferred to
the ultimate recipient designated by the original owner of the
property. However, it is perfectly conceivable that a surviving
spouse would transfer the income interest to A, even though the
remainder of the property is vested in B. Why A should be ex-
pected to pay the gift tax on the transfer, except by reason of the
secondary liability imposed by section 6324(b), as in the case of
any other transfer, is difficult to fathom. Does this provision have
the effect of creating a net gift? Second, even assuming that the
transfer of the life interest is to the ultimate recipient of the prop-
erty, the Committee's formula does not necessarily, make the recip-
ients of the second transferor's bounty whole. Keep in mind that
we now have unified estate and gift taxes so that any transfer has
an impact beyond the particular year in which the transfer is
made. Thus, a transfer of a qualifying income interest in year five
will be treated as a transfer for purposes of computing the estate
tax when the transferor of that income interest finally dies. Fre-
quently, the gift tax on the transfer during the surviving spouse's
life will be relatively low, but the impact on the estate tax when
the surviving spouse finally dies could be much more substantial.
Yet the only tax burden which is offset is the initial gift tax cost
and not the ultimate tax cost of having the property treated as
taxable in the hands of the surviving spouse. Finally, the gift tax
imposed on the transfer may use some or all of the spouse's unified
credit. If so, the credit is used and the cost of the loss of the credit
may not be recovered from the donee.
In the case of a lifetime transfer to a spouse of a qualifying
income interest, the interest would be eligible for the annual exclu-
sion, but this would be irrelevant in view of its qualification as
qualified terminable interest property. This means that the 100%
marital deduction is available. On the other hand, a disposition of
the remainder interest, presumably at the same time, would not be
eligible for the annual exclusion. If the income interest is trans-
ferred by the donor's spouse, it would be eligible for the annual




1. In general. Joint property is another area to which Con-
gress has given increased attention recently and in which the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 effected a significant change. As is
well known, prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
section 2040 provided that property held jointly with the right of
survivorship was includable in the estate of the first to die, except
to the extent the survivor could show that he or she had contrib-
uted to the acquisition or improvement of the property. This sys-
tem produced certain anomalies inasmuch as the decedent could
make a taxable gift on transferring property into joint names, pay
a gift tax, and yet the property would nonetheless be fully includ-
able in his estate. In addition, the problems of tracing the contri-
bution of spouses, especially where there were subsequent im-
provements to the property or the property had been purchased
with a mortgage, were regarded by some as needless complications.
In 1976 and 1978, Congress substantially revised section 2040
in two major respects. First, Congress introduced provisions which
treated material participation in a farm or other business by the
surviving spouse as a contribution to the joint property, justifying
exclusion of the joint property from the decedent's estate to the
extent of contribution.9 7 This provision, which had certain com-
plexities, was repealed by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981.98
Second, and more importantly, Congress created what was
known as a "qualified joint interest." 99 The essential purpose of
the qualified joint interest concept was to rectify the anomaly re-
ferred to above. It permitted a husband and wife, by electing to
have a transfer into joint names treated as a gift, to exclude one-
half of the value of jointly held property from the estate of the first
to die. In this connection, it will be recalled that under section
2515 a transfer of real estate into joint names was not treated as a
taxable gift. Therefore, with respect to property most commonly
held jointly, real estate, no gift tax had been paid. This being so,
the taxing of all of the property in the estate of the first to die,
97. LR.C. § 2040(c) (added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 600, § 511,.92 Stat.
2763; repealed 1981).
98. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(c)(3)(A).
99. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2) (amended by ERTA, supra note 2, at § 403(c)(1)).
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assuming that the consideration for the property had originated
with the decedent, was not as anomalous as it might have seemed
on the surface. In any event, under the qualified joint interest pro-
visions adopted in 1976, taxpayers could elect to treat the transfer
of real estate into joint names as being taxable and, even if no gift
tax were payable by reason of the marital deduction, annual exclu-
sion, and the unified credit, the property was treated as being
owned half by the decedent and half by the surviving spouse.
Thereafter, only half was includable in the estate of the first to die.
Of course, since only half was included in the estate of the first to
die, only half received a step-up in basis at that time. As part of
the 1976 changes, there were provisions made for permitting indi-
viduals who already held property in joint names to transform
their interest into qualified joint interests. 100 Presumably this was
done in some cases.
The 1981 Act, besides repealing the concept of'material partic-
ipation, significantly revised the rules dealing with joint property
and provided that such property was to be treated as being owned
half and half by husband and wife, irrespective of which spouse
contributed to the acquisition of the property. Therefore, only half
would be included in the estate of the first spouse to die. These
provisions apply only in the case of property held jointly by hus-
band and wife. Section 2515, which provided that no gift resulted
on the transfer of the property into joint names, and section
2515A, added by the Revenue Act of 1976 to provide similar rules
with respect to joint ownership of personal property, were
repealed.
2. Legislative history. The House report discussion of the
joint property changes is presented as part of the discussion of the
unlimited marital deduction. The report simply states that the
present rules governing the taxation of jointly held property be-
tween spouses were unnecessarily complex, the tracing require-
ments burdensome, and there was widespread noncompliance be-
cause few taxpayers understood the gift tax consequences of joint
ownership. 0 1
The Ways and Means Committee also noted that in view of
100. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 535 (Comm. Print 1976).
101. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 160.
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the unlimited marital deduction, the taxation of jointly held prop-
erty between spouses is only relevant for determining the basis of
property of the survivor and the qualification for certain provi-
sions, such as sections 2032A, 6166, 6166A, and 303.102 The House
report concluded that it should adopt what it regarded as an easily
administered rule under which each spouse would be considered to
own one-half of jointly held property regardless of which spouse
furnished the original consideration. 10 3 The Senate report is essen-
tially to the same effect.10'
3. Significance of the change. The new rule, which has the
effect of treating joint property for estate gift tax purposes as
owned by a married couple half and half, has certain advantages
and disadvantages. The change, of course, limits tracing, and the
unlimited marital deduction eliminates the necessity of paying a
gift tax, using some of the unlimited credit, or spreading the trans-
fer over several years in order to get property into joint names. On
the other hand, the fact that property is deemed owned half by
each spouse means that on the death of the first to die, only half
will be included in the decedent's estate and, therefore, only half
will be subject to a step-up in basis. Had all the property been
owned by the decedent, the property could have been left to the
wife without any tax by using the unlimited maritial deduction,
and at the same time the full amount of the property, not just half,
would have been stepped-up to fair market value. However, if the
property can be converted to community property, a step-up for
both halves is obtainable.
It must be recognized that if property is not in joint names
and the owner of the property-presumably the spouse whose con-
tribution produced the property-is the surviving spouse, then
none of the property will have a stepped-up basis in the hands of
the surviving spouse, since it will not be property of the decedent
and will not take a step-up in basis at all. This problem cannot be
solved by transferring all of a property to the noncontributing
spouse shortly before his or her death, or partly mitigated by put-
ting the property into joint names shortly before his or her death.
The provisions of section 1014(e), which preclude a step-up in the
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 49, at 126-27.
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basis of appreciated property acquired by a decedent by gift within
one year of death, would apply, and the basis of such property in
the hands of the donor who acquires the property from the dece-
dent would be the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of
the decedent immediately before his or her death. The 50% step-
up for joint property is consistent with the idea of no step-up for
individually owned property, absent death.
It may be possible to deal with this problem by using the pro-
visions of section 2036. For example, assume that a husband who
has created a property interest transfers it to his wife and reserves
the right to use the property for his life if it is tangible property, or
reserves the right to income if it is intangible property. If the do-
nor spouse dies first, the property will be in his estate, pursuant to
the provisions of section 2036, which include in the decedent's es-
tate any property which he transferred during his life where he
reserved the right to the income or use of the property. At the
same time, if the spouse with actual ownership of the property dies
prior to the donor spouse, the property would be in that spouse's
estate. Thus, the decedent's estate will presumably obtain a basis
step-up beyond the value attributable to the reservation of rights
by the donor spouse.
This technique probably can be used with respect to joint
property as well. That is, the husband transfers the property into
joint names, but reserves the right to all the income or, if it is tan-
gible property, the right to use the property to the exclusion of his
wife. It would seem that this technique would be effective even in
the case of joint property, although, particularly in the case of tan-
gible property, it may be difficult to show that the decedent did
retain the right to use, including the right to exclude. This is espe-
cially true where what has been given is the family home which
was jointly occupied. One may speculate whether the value of a
step-up in basis is sufficient to justify these kinds of maneuvers.
Although they have no federal estate tax impact, they have signifi-
cant collateral state and local law consequences.
One must still confront the question-perhaps the most fre-
quently asked question-should property be placed in joint
names? The local law aspects of joint property are well known.
When half an intrest in property is given away, it is given away.
On the other hand, many states have enacted for matrimonial dis-
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pute purposes the so-called equitable distribution system, 105
whereby the actual ownership of the property is rendered consider-
ably less relevant in dividing the couple's property in divorce. The
property is divided based on the overall equities, considering the
contributions of each spouse to the marriage and so on. Thus, in an
equitable distribution state, the lawyer's prior concern with respect
to joint property-its impact in the event of a dissolution of the
marriage-is significantly reduced.
With respect to the tax aspects, the unlimited marital gift tax
deduction has eliminated any tax barrier to the transfer of prop-
erty into joint names, and the unlimited marital deduction for es-
tate tax purposes has eliminated the significance of holding prop-
erty jointly or severally. If held severally by the decedent, the
property passes tax-free to the surviving spouse. If held by the sur-
vivor, it is not subject to tax in the hands of the decedent. If held
jointly, half will be included in the estate of the decedent and will
pass tax-free to the survivor pursuant to the unlimited marital de-
duction. If the unlimited marital deduction is not claimed and the
old 50% marital deduction formula is adhered to, half of the joint
property passing to the surviving spouse by right of survivorship
will be treated as fulfilling part of the marital bequest and is a part
of the half of the decedent's property which the surviving spouse is
bequeathed. If the property is not held jointly, the full amount
can, of course, be bequeathed specifically or otherwise to the sur-
viving spouse.
Thus, it appears that from an estate tax standpoint, there is
no particular advantage or disadvantage to holding property in
joint names. However, when one reflects upon the basis of prop-
erty, there are certain considerations, outlined above, which sug-
gest that assuming the contributing spouse will be the first to die,
one should not hold property in joint names. This is true because a
step-up in basis of all of the property will be received without es-
tate tax cost if the contributing spouse dies first and the property
is wholly in his name. If the property is owned jointly, however,
only half will receive a step-up in basis. Whether this is sufficient
to lead counsellors to recommend that property not be held in
joint names remains to be seen.
One must also shed a tear for those individuals who were so
105. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 Part B (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
[Vol. 31
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX
rash as to take advantage of the change with respect to joint prop-
erty adopted in 1976. It will be recalled that at that time, Congress
made it possible for an individual to exclude half of any joint prop-
erty in the name of husband and wife from the estate of the first to
die on the condition that the parties elect to treat the creation of
the joint interest as a gift. If the property was already in joint
names, one could achieve the same result by retransfers. No doubt
many of the individuals who took advantage of this provision ar-
ranged to do so without the payment of any gift tax. But there
may be some who felt the estate tax exclusion and the equalization
of estates were sufficiently advantageous to justify incurring a gift
tax liability. If someone did incur a substantial gift tax liability as
a result of electing to take the benefit of the 1976 changes, he or
she might well complain. From 1982 on, such equalization can be
achieved tax-free, simply and directly. The dust has barely settled
on the 1976 changes and Congress has adopted new rules which are
different in conception from those which had been applied for
many, many years, and also different from the concept recently
adopted in 1976. Even more depressing to those individuals who
took advantage of the 1976 changes, if they were not able to cover
the transfer with the per donee exclusion, is the fact that they have
made a transfer which will be considered in fixing the final rate
they will have to pay for estate tax purposes.
G. Increase in Per Donee Gift Tax Exclusion, Tuition and Medi-
cal Expense Exclusion, and Annual Filing of Returns
1. In general. Another significant change made by the Act, at
least for the extremely wealthy, is the increase in annual per donee
exclusion to $10,000 from $3,000 ($20,000 if the couple elects to
split gifts) and the treatment of payments of tuition and medical
expenses as nontaxable transfers. 06 Gift tax returns were also
made due, as before, on a yearly basis.
10 7
Under the Act, the increase to $10,000 applies to transfers af-
ter December 31, 1981, and a separate transitional rule is pro-
vided.'08 The transitional rule is that if: (1) an instrument is exe-
cuted before September 12, 1982, (2) which provides for the power
106. I.R.C. §§ 2503(b), 2503(e) (1982).
107. I.R.C. § 6075(b)(1) (1982).
108. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 441(c)(2).
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of appointment-really a power of invasion if one is thinking of a
Crummey power' 09-and the power is defined in terms of the
amount of the gift tax exclusion under section 2503(b), (3) the in-
strument has not been amended, and (4) the state has not enacted
a statute construing any reference to section 2503(b) as meaning
2503(b) after the 1981 enactment, then the increase to $10,000
from $3,000 "shall not apply to such gift."11 °
2. Legislative history. In proposing an increase in the annual
gift tax exclusion, both committee reports refer to the fact that the
exclusion was intended originally to be a matter of administrative
convenience. The 1981 House report quotes the original Senate re-
port to the effect that the exclusion was intended to "obviate the
necessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous small
gifts. . .. ,,2 In 1932, the House had proposed a $3,000 exclusion.
The Senate increased that figure to $5,000, and the $5,000 exclu-
sion was enacted. The 1981 Senate report chose to quote from the
1932 report the statement that this amount was intended to be
"sufficiently large to cover in most cases wedding and Christmas
gifts and occasional gifts of relatively small amounts."1 2 The
$3,000 level was set in 1942, and it has been a point of some won-
der that Congress believed numerous citizens were making Christ-
mas and wedding gifts of this size and that a gift of $3,000 can be
regarded as a "relatively small" amount.
The increase to $10,000 seems to ignore the importance that
the annual exclusion has assumed in estate planning. The almost
invariable recommendation to a prospective decedent intent on
saving taxes prior to 1982 was that he and his spouse split gifts
and transfer each year $6,000 to as many objects of their bounty as
were available. Needless to say this advice is only of utility for the
wealthy. Both committee reports quite accurately point out that
inflation has reduced the real value of the exclusion. The commit-
tees proceeded to increase the exclusion to $10,000, whereas a
$3,000 exclusion in 1942 would be equivalent to an exclusion of
about $16,500 in 1981 dollars.
In addition, the Ways and Means Committee proposed an ad-
109. For an explanation of a Crummey power, see infra text accompanying note 124.
110. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 441(c)(2) (last line, flush language).
111. H. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 193 (quoting S, RaP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1932)).
112. S. RaP. No. 144, supra note 49, at 129.
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ditional exclusion for tuition and medical expenses which was ulti-
mately accepted in conference and has become law.113 The Com-
mittee stated that while certain payments of tuition on behalf of
children who have attained their majority and certain payments of
medical expenses on behalf of elderly relatives are technically con-
sidered gifts under present law, they should nonetheless be exempt
regardless of the amount paid. 14 The provision, however, is not
limited to medical expenses paid for elderly relatives, nor is the
tuition exclusion limited to children.
3. Significance of the increase. The substantial increase in
the annual exclusion will permit the wealthy to transfer over their
lives substantial amounts of property to the objects of their
bounty, free of any transfer tax. In view of the magnitude of the
sums which could be transferred free of tax even prior to the 1981
Act, where a husband and wife elect to split gifts, only the ex-
tremely wealthy will be able to take advantage of the new provi-
sion. For example, consider a husband and wife with a $10,000,000
taxable estate, two children, and four grandchildren. Each year
they may transfer $120,000 gift-tax-free to the children and
grandchildren without the transfer having any impact on the
transfer tax which would be ultimately imposed on the disposition
of their estate. Over ten years, $1,200,000 can be transferred, com-
ing off the top of an estate eligible for the 50% top rate, which
means a savings of approximately $600,000, in addition to the in-
come tax savings which are likely to result. The fact that such gifts
are not regarded as transfers for purposes of computing the rate
applicable on their estate is of less importance because the new
50% top rate is reached by an estate of $2,500,000.
This benefit is not without its problems, and the major diffi-
culty is how to handle sums of this magnitude on behalf of donees
who are under the age of majority or, even if they have attained
their majority, are under the age of discretion. Because of the size
of the sums that would be involved in a consistent gifting program,
one would anticipate that trusts would be utilized rather than
transfers under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.115 A grandchild
whose paternal and maternal grandparents both embark on an an-
113. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (1982).
114. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 193.
115. UNiF. Gnars To MINORS ACT, 8 U.L.A. 181 (1966) (adopted in N.Y. EST. PoWERS &
TRUSTS LAW §§ 7-4.1-7-4.12 (McKinney 1967)).
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nual gifting program will have an $800,000 trust at the time he or
she turns twenty-one, not counting income and appreciation. This
may well be a more substantial sum than the grandparents are pre-
pared to place in the hands of a twenty-one year old.
In order to obtain the exclusion with respect to transfers in
trust to minors, section 2503(c) must be utilized. That section per-
mits an annual exclusion for a gift to an individual under the age
of twenty-one, even though the interest may technically constitute
a future interest. This exclusion is conditioned upon the require-
ment that the property and the income therefrom may be ex-
pended by or for the benefit of the donee before attaining the age
of twenty-one years, and to the extent it is not expended it will
pass to the donee on his attaining twenty-one. 116 If he dies, it must
be payable to his estate or as he may appoint.
It is established law under section 2503(c) that, in referring to
the property and the income therefrom, an income interest alone
can be considered property so that there is no requirement that
the corpus be passed to the donee upon attaining his majority.117
However, this means that there is no exclusion with respect to the
corpus. Furthermore, over the years the Internal Revenue Service
has grown increasingly liberal in its interpretation of what consti-
tutes passage to the donee upon his attaining twenty-one years.
Presently, so long as there is a short period of time following the
donee's attainment of twenty-one where he can elect for a brief
period to take the property, the original transfer qualifies for the
exclusion, even though, if the donee fails to make the election, the
property continues in trust for an unlimited period. 118
116. I.R.C. § 2530(c) (1982).
117. Rev. Rul. 68-670, 1968-2 C.B. 413.
118. In Rev. Rul. 74-43, 1974-1 C.B. 285, the Service ruled that § 2503's requirements
were complied with if the beneficiary had: (1) a continuing right after 21 to compel a dis-
tribution, or (2) a right during a limited period to compel a distribution of the corpus. Rev.
Rul. 74-43 revoked Rev. Rul. 60-218, 1960-1 C.B. 387, which held that § 2503(c) was not
complied with if one provided that a trust was extended unless the minor at 21 elected to
terminate it. Consider the alternative approach discussed later in the text and related au-
thorities where a present interest is sought not under § 2503 (c), but because the annual gift
may be withdrawn for a brief period. In I.R.S., Private Letter Ruling 7946007 (July 26,
1979), the Service ruled that, where a trust was set up on December 29 and the beneficiary
was not informed of his right to demand distribution by the end of that year, there was no
present interest. However, in I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 8022048 (Mar. 4, 1980), the Ser-
vice ruled that a gift to a trust for the benefit of a minor daughter during the last week in
December qualified as a present interest as the donor-parent was the natural guardian of his
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As a consequence of the increased amount which can now be
transferred tax-free by use of the increased per donee exclusion,
there will be increased pressure by donors to restrict the rights of
the donee on attaining age twenty-one and to continue the prop-
erty in trust until the donee reaches a more advanced age. As indi-
cated above, the Internal Revenue Service has generally acquiesced
in restrictions on the donee's right to elect, but one can expect ad-
ditional skirmishing in this area in situations where the magnitude
of the sums transferred makes a possible taking of all of the prop-
erty at age twenty-one of great concern to the donor.
Alternatively, a present interest in a trust results if the benefi-
ciary, or, if a minor, an authorized representative, has the power
for a period to withdraw the annual gift from the trust, even if the
right to withdraw does not continue for the future. These are the
so-called Crummey trusts discussed below.
A good deal of litigation has considered the extent to which a
present interest exists when withdrawals of annual gifts are cir-
cumscribed in some way, and more of such dispute can be ex-
pected. One may anticipate that the use of this sort of power to
avoid all the restrictions of section 2503(c) will prove popular.
The 1982 increase in the per donee exclusion to $10,000 also
facilitates the use of short-term trusts. As is well known, under
section 673(a) the transfer of property for a ten year and one day
term, income to the donee, reversion to the donor, is a useful vehi-
cle for shifting income from a high bracket donor to a low bracket
donee, often a child. When the exclusion was $3,000, a donor and a
spouse joining in a gift could transfer about $13,300 to such a trust
without gift tax. The value of the income interest was about
$6,000, which was covered by the per donee exclusion, and the bal-
ance was the remainder which was not a gift because it was re-
tained by the donor. The new annual exclusion of $10,000 permits
approximately $44,400 of property to be transferred into trust by a
donor who elects to split a gift with his or her spouse without any
minor daughter under local law, and the state permitted a guardian to receive property
distributed from the trust. The trust agreement permitted withdrawal of $3,000. Since the
donor as natural guardian possessed actual knowledge and the legal right to withdraw, the
gift was deemed a present interest. The Service refused to rule whether gifts during Decem-
ber qualified as a present interest where a withdrawal could only be made by a legal guard-
ian, because if a legal guardian had been required, it would have taken several days to ob-
tain the necessary appointment.
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gift or estate tax impact. If one is not married, essentially the same
result can be achieved by a gift of $22,200 in December and an
additional $22,200 in January. If one is married, $88,800 can be
transferred on the same basis. At present interest rates a single
split gift would produce significant income to the donee. Transfers
under section 673(c) to elderly relatives where the reversion is trig-
gered by the death of the income beneficiary will also be favorably
affected, but the size of the gift which can be given tax-free will
depend upon the age of the donee.
The principal advantage of a short-term trust has always been
the income tax benefit, but its use was sometimes inhibited be-
cause of the gift tax consequences of creation. Now that the gift
tax consequences have been eased, one may expect more use of
short-term trusts as a vehicle to provide college costs (beyond tui-
tion, now otherwise gift-tax-free) or other support for a needy
child or relative. Again, it is the well-to-do with capital who pri-
marily benefit since individuals with relatively high incomes often
do not have sufficient capital to establish a substantial short-term
trust.
4. The exclusion of tuition and medical expenses. As previ-
ously noted, the Act provides that any amounts paid on behalf of
any individual (whether related or not) as tuition to a recognized
educational organization for the education and training of such in-
dividual, or as payment for medical care to any person who pro-
vides medical care as defined in section 213(e), will not be consid-
ered transfers by gift. In one sense, the provision provides a trap
for the unwary. The statute requires, and the House report con-
firms, that the exclusion for expenses and tuition is applicable only
with respect to payments made directly to the individual or insti-
tution providing the service.119 Payment to a child by a check
which he endorses over to his college presumably would not
qualify.
The exclusion for medical expenses includes medical insurance
and all those medical expenses as defined in section 13, i.e., those
incurred essentially for the diagnosis, cure, medication, treatment,
or prevention of disease or for the purpose of affecting any struc-
ture or function of the body. If the individual receiving the medical
care has his expenses reimbursed by insurance, the payment by a
119. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 193-94.
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donor of an expense which would otherwise qualify for the exclu-
sion is not eligible for exclusion irrespective of when the reim-
bursement is made.
The exclusion for educational expenses requires that the pay-
ment be made to an educational organization as described in sec-
tion 170(b)(1)(A)(ii); that is, an institution which normally main-
tains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regular
body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its
educational activities are regularly carried on. This exclusion ap-
plies to both full and part-time students, but only as to tuition
costs, not extending to books, dormitory fees, transportation to
school, and so on.
This provision has the effect of making more clear than ever
that amounts which can be regarded as quasi-support under local
law are subject to gift tax if they are not payments for tuition or
medical care. The House report states that in providing for this
exclusion, the Ways and Means Committee did not intend to
change "the law that there is no gift if the person paying the medi-
cal expense or tuition is under an obligation under local law to pro-
vide such items to the recipient."120 In such a case the payment is
not a gift because it is in discharge of an obligation to support. But
the problem lies in defining what is encompassed by the obligation
to support. There has always been a bit of uncertainty as to how
payments which are not in discharge of an obligation of support
under local law are to be handled, and as a practical matter many
quasi-support payments which are technically gifts go unreported.
As one prominent text states, the practice is probably different
than what the law technically requires. 2 This change can be re-
garded as an affirmation by Congress that it intends to treat as a
gift, if in excess of the annual exclusion, payments which are not
regarded as discharging an obligation to support under local law.
The problems in this area are likely to arise only in situations
where the donor has embarked on an annual giving program so
that the exclusion is not available when the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice questions the treatment of a particular payment. For example,
parents with an annual giving program who provide their son with
120. Id. at 194.
121. STEPHENS, MAXFIELD & LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION,
10.02[5][a](1978) ("Theory and practice are bound to diverge on such issues.").
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an automobile on his high school graduation may find it difficult to
justify a car as an item of support under local law so that no gift
tax is due.
The House report also states: "In addition, the Committee bill
does not change the income tax consequences otherwise applicable
to such payments. ' 122 The reference to the income tax conse-
quences is presumably a reference to the rule established under
Regulation section 1.662(a)-4 to the effect that if a trust makes a
payment which has the effect of discharging someone's obligation
to support the beneficiary of the trust, it shall be deemed income
to the person whose duty to support is discharged, though not re-
ceived by him. Furthermore, this reference would seem to indicate
that the son receiving the car in the example above would not be
subject to income tax. One general. difference between the income
tax law in its approach to gifts and the gift tax law is that in the
gift tax law donative intent is irrelevant; a gift is made if value is
transferred without consideration, even if there is no donative in-
tent, provided it was not a transfer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. On the other hand, under the income tax law, to have a gift
excluded from the donee's income there must be donative intent.
It seems reasonably clear in the car example given above that the
parents have donative intent so that the expected income tax re-
sult-no income to the son-would obtain.
5. Effective dates and Crummey trusts. As noted above,
these new rules apply to transfers made after December 31, 1981,
but a separate, permanent transitional rule is provided. 123 The
transitional rule is that if: (1) an instrument is executed prior to
September 12, 1982, (2) containing a power of appointment
phrased in terms of the amount of gift tax inclusion under section
2503(b), (3) the instrument has not been amended on or after Sep-
tember 12, 1982, and (4) the state has not enacted a statute under
which such a power of appointment is to be construed as being
defined in terms of the amount of the $10,000 exclusion under sec-
tion 2503(b), then the amendment increasing the exclusion to
$10,000 shall not apply.
Congress recognized that many existing trusts provide powers
of appointments specifically defined in terms of the section 2503(b)
122. H.R. REP. No. 201, supra note 30, at 194.
123. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 441(c)(2).
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annual gift tax exclusion of $3,000. Presumably this is a reference
to trusts which include so-called Crummey powers which, by au-
thorizing the donee to withdraw $3,000 of the property transferred,
ensure that the transfer qualifies for the annual exclusion even
though it would otherwise be regarded as a future interest.124 The
House version of the transitional rule, which prevailed, apparently
was intended to preserve the $3,000 limitation on withdrawals
from Crummey trusts.
1 25
The Senate had proposed only a two-year transitional rule.
Under the Senate bill, the two-year transitional rule provided that
the increased annual gift tax exclusion would not apply to instru-
ments in which powers are defined in terms of section 2503(b), and
such powers were granted under a trust created before thirty days
after the date of enactment and not amended after that date, if
there is no state law applicable to such instrument which would
construe the power as referring to the increased gift tax exclu-
sion.' 2' The proposed rule, however, was to be effective only with
respect to powers exercisable after December 31, 1981, and before
January 1, 1984. This, according to the Finance Committee, would
provide sufficient time for trustees to obtain clarification of the do-
nor's intent through judicial construction of the trust governing in-
strument.1 27 Had the Senate change been enacted, one must won-
der whether it would have been effective under state law to alter
the terms of a trust, assuming no state statute was passed specifi-
cally confirming the interpretation that the expanded exclusion
was met. The Senate apparently assumed that it may change the
local law interpretation of a trust provision. The conference com-
mittee wisely did not press the issue.
There are also interpretive problems with the effective date as
enacted. The transitional rule provides that if the instrument has
not been amended, "and" the donor's state has not enacted a stat-
ute redefining the reference to section 2503(b), then the amend-
ment made by subsection (a) which would increase the gift tax ex-
124. Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). A Crummey power autho-
rizes the donee to withdraw $3,000 of the property transferred and insures that the transfer
qualifies for the annual exclusion even though it would otherwise be regarded as a future
interest.
125. H.J. Res. 266, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1981).




clusion to $10,000 "shall not apply to such gift. '128 Literally
interpreted, this would seem to mean that the instrument must be
amended and the state must have enacted a statute providing for a
revised interpretation of instruments before the high exclusion is
available. Presumably it was intended that either one would be ef-
fective to make the $10,000 exclusion available. It is hoped that the
regulations will adopt this view.
The second interpretive difficulty is the fact that if the transi-
tional rule applies, the increase to $10,000 from $3,000 shall not
apply "to such gift." The problem is that Congress did not wish to
alter instruments because of its change in exclusion, but whether it
did or did not make such alteration depends, it would seem, on
state law. Should Congress attempt to dictate state law? Assume
an individual has created a Crummey trust, defined in terms of the
$3,000 limit, and makes a transfer to that trust. Is it likely that
local law would interpret the trust in 1982 and beyond as permit-
ting a withdrawal of $10,000? If it did, why should the donor be
denied a full exclusion on a gift of $5,000? Assuming the require-
ments for the exclusion are met, it is the extra withdrawal that the
change could permit against the will of the donor that is of con-
cern, not the amount of the exclusion. Can Congress, by saying
that a $10,000 exclusion is not available, change a power to invade?
Suppose the trust grants a power to invade to the extent of $3,000
or "such other amount as Congress sets under section 2503(b)." Is
the exclusion $3,000, or $10,000? Ten thousand dollars would seem
to be the amount of invasion permitted under local law and the
effective date provision doesn't seem to alter that conclusion, yet it
seems to limit the exclusion in such a case to $3,000.
This question aside, the problems created by the new changes
for a donor who has set up a Crummey trust are not great, but
they may cause some inconvenience. First, it would seem reasona-
ble for a state to adopt a rule as anticipated by Congress that a
reference with power defined in terms of section 2503(b) would be
interpreted to mean $10,000 rather than $3,000. It can be reasona-
bly assumed that most of the individuals who have created a trust
of this nature would prefer to take full advantage of new section
2503(b), rather than be bound by the old $3,000 limit. For those
few who would not wish to take advantage of the full limit, they
128. ERTA, supra note 2, at § 441(c)(2)(last line, flush language).
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may establish another trust, or limit their gifts to $3,000 so that
the increase to a $10,000 draw-out does not as a practical matter
expand the rights of the beneficiary.
On the other hand, there would seem to be comparatively lit-
tle difficulty for a grantor who wishes to take advantage of the
$10,000 limit to create a new trust rather than waiting to see what
state law will provide. This assumes that the existing trust cannot
be effectively amended to increase the limitation to $10,000. More-
over, one should keep in mind that depending upon the terms of
the particular trust, granting the income beneficiary the right to
withdraw $10,000 may have transfer tax consequences as well as
income tax consequences to the beneficiary with the power. The
possible income tax consequences under sections 671 through 679
generally have been ignored in the past, and the transfer tax conse-
quences were obviated by the provisions of sections 2041(b)(2) and
2514(e) so that a lapse of a power of appointment does not produce
transfer tax consequences where the property subject to the power
did not exceed the greater of $5,000 or 5% of the assets from
which the lapsed power could be satisfied. So long as the annual
exclusion was $3,000, one could be certain there would be no trans-
fer tax consequences to the beneficiary who did not exercise his
power to withdraw the $3,000 from the trust, thus effectively trans-
ferring all but the income interest in the $3,000 to the remainder-
man. Now that the exclusion amount has been increased to
$10,000, however, the protection of sections 2040(b)(2) and 2514(e)
is no longer available, and a beneficiary who does not take out the
$10,000 annual portion may be deemed to have made a gift to the
remainderman and to have retained the income from the gift so
that the $10,000 is includable in his estate.
H. Estate Tax Treatment of Transfers Made Within Three
Years of Death
1. In general. In the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Congress saw fit to add another chapter to the long and tortured
history of dealing with transfers within three years of death.
Whether the changes made will simplify the law or introduce new
complications remains to be seen. Under the Act, section 2035 will
no longer automatically bring in property transferred by the dece-
dent within three years of his death, and its scope is much circum-
scribed. The inclusion is retained with respect to gifts of life insur-
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ance and interests in property which, if retained until death, would
be includable in the gross estate under sections 2036, 2037, 2038,
and 2042. Furthermore, the Act requires the inclusion of all trans-
fers made within three years of death (other than gifts eligible for
the annual gift tax exclusion) solely for purposes of determining
the estate's qualification for the special benefits provided by sec-
tion 303 (capital gain redemption), section 2032A (special use valu-
ation), section 6166 (deferred payment of estate tax), and for pur-
poses of determining what property is subject to the estate tax
lien. Furthermore, section 2035 will continue to require the inclu-
sion of all gift taxes paid by the decedent or his estate on any gift
made by the decedent or his spouse after December 31, 1976 and
within three years of death.
Without reviewing in tortuous detail the history of section
2035 and its predecessors, a history amply set forth in other
quarters, it is worth noting briefly the saga that began in 1916. In
1916, with the enactment of the modern estate tax, all transfers
made in contemplation of death were includable and those made
within two years of death were presumptively made in contempla-
tion of death.129 In 1926 Congress, dissatisfied with the 1916 rule
which incorporated a rebuttable presumption, declared that trans-
fers made within two years of death were conclusively presumed to
have been made in contemplation of death and, therefore, includ-
able in the decedent's gross estate.130 When the Supreme Court
held this irrebuttable presumption unconstitutional in Heiner v.
Donnan,1 3 Congress responded that same year by eliminating the
conclusive presumption and returning to the rebuttable presump-
tion.3 2 In 1950, the two-year period was increased to three years
and transfers made prior to three years were made not subject to
inclusion.13 3 So the law remained until 1976. In the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, in conjunction with the adoption of the unified trans-
fer concept, Congress saw fit to mandate the inclusion in the gross
estate of all transfers made within three years of death.134 The leg-
129. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756, 777-78.
130. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 9, 70.
131. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
132. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 169, 279 (amending Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70).
133. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 501(c), 64 Stat. 906, 962 (amending I.R.C. § 811
(1939)).
134. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 1, at § 2001(a)(5).
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islative history of the 1976 Act shows that Congress concluded, in
light of the nature of the unified transfer approach, that
mandatory inclusion would not be unconstitutional.
1 3 5
In 1981, in the Economic Recovery Tax Act, the Finance and
Ways and Means Committees returned to their contemplation of
transfers within three years of death under section 2035 and each
came up with a different solution. Ultimately, the proposal of the
Ways and Means Committee prevailed.
2. Legislative history. The Finance Committee's approach
was to conclude that there was no reason to tax appreciation that
accrued after a gift had been made.136 However, the Committee did
not repeal section 2035. Instead, it included gifts made within
three years of death at their value at the time of the gift in order
to deny prospective decedents the possibility of making deathbed
transfers which would enable them to change the size and the
makeup of the gross estate so as to qualify for section 303 (capital
gain redemption), section 2032A (special use valuation) and section
6166 (reduced interest rate) benefits. The Committee indicated
that it would in no event have repealed section 2035 for life insur-
ance.13 7 Such property would continue to be included at date of
death fair market value.
The House version, which ultimately prevailed, took a slightly
different tack. The Ways and Means Committee proposed that sec-
tion 2035 not be applicable to estates of decedents dying after De-
cember 31, 1981. Section 2035 was retained, however, with respect
to gifts of "life insurance" and "interests in property otherwise in-
cludable in the value of the gross estate pursuant to sections 2036,
2037, 2038, 2041 or 2042. .. ."1 Moreover, the House bill re-
quired the inclusion of all transfers made within three years of
death (other than gifts eligible for the annual gift tax exclusion)
for purposes of determining the estate's qualification for the spe-
cial benefits provided by section 303, section 2032A and section
6166, and for purposes of determining the property subject to the
estate tax lien. Since "contemplation" property will not normally
135. See H.R. RF. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976). See also STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX RE-
FORM AcT OF 1976, 528-29 (Comm. Print 1976).
136. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 49, at 138.
137. Id.
138. H.R. 4242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 424(a)(1981).
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be includable in the donor's estate, it will no longer be accorded a
step-up in basis in the hands of the donee.
3. The significance of the change. As indicated in the general
discussion above, it does not appear that this provision will have
any great significance for estate tax purposes. As has been ex-
plained, under the unified transfer tax concept the amount of any
gift which is made, valued at the time of the gift, is considered in
fixing the ultimate amount of transfer taxes to be paid by a dece-
dent. For that reason, if there is no appreciation, there is no differ-
ence in result whether a transfer was made within or before three
years of death. On the other hand, if the transferred property ap-
preciates substantially, old section 2035 would have brought back
and subjected to estate tax that appreciation. Beginning in 1982,
this is no longer the rule, and such appreciation, if any, will not be
subject to estate tax in the estate of the donor-decedent.
On the income tax side, it might be thought that the loss of a
stepped-up basis would cause pain to all taxpayers. It depends.
Putting aside situtations where the 100% marital deduction is
used or the estate is so small that there is no estate tax loss in
passing the property through the estate of the decedent, it appears
that it will not always be so painful. There is little detriment if all
that is at issue is post-gift appreciation, but there is considerable
detriment if substantial pre-gift and little post-gift appreciation is
at stake.
The first estate tax bracket once the unified credit is fully
phased-in to $192,800 is 37%. The maximum tax on capital gains
under the Act is 20%. Therefore, in the case of post-gift apprecia-
tion, a 37% tax would have to be paid to save a 20% tax. Accord-
ingly, unless the decedent's estate (including the gift) after the
marital and other deductions is less than $600,000 (the amount ex-
empt by the unified credit), so that inclusion produces no estate
tax detriment, the value of the step-up would be less than the es-
tate tax cost.
For example, if the property was acquired long before the gift
and had substantially appreciated at that time, an analysis will
show there would be very little impact from the loss of a step-up in
basis if there is also substantial post-gift appreciation. Assume that
an individual acquired stock for $1,000 which has appreciated to
$101,000 at the time of a gift to his favorite nephew. Assume the
individual dies two and one-half years later, and the stock is worth
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$201,000. The donee's basis at the time of the gift was $1,000, so
that at the time of the decedent's death, under the old law, he
would face a capital gains tax on $200,000 at a 20% rate, or
$40,000. The inclusion of the property in the decedent's estate
under old section 2035 would have the effect of eliminating any
appreciation and giving the donee a basis of $201,000 in the prop-
erty. Only $100,000, the difference between the value at the date of
the gift and the value at the date of death would be, as a practical
matter, subject to tax by reason of new section 2035. The first
$101,000, the value at the date of gift, would be subject to the uni-
fied transfer tax in any event, as a result of the transfer. Inclusion
of an additional $100,000 would produce a tax of $37,000 at the
lowest bracket and a $40,000 capital gains tax would be saved. If
the estate were in the 50% bracket, the estate tax cost would be
$50,000, and the income tax saving would remain at $40,000. Thus
it can be seen that, even in a situation where the property is sub-
stantially appreciated in the hands of the donor, inclusion in the
gross estate of the donor is not necessarily advantageous. The ad-
ditional amount included for estate tax purposes and the tax im-
posed thereon may be higher than the amount of capital gains tax
which would be eliminated had the property been included.
If the donor's $1,000 stock had not appreciated at all at the
time of the gift, but had appreciated to $201,000 by the time of the
donor's death, the results would be as follows: The donee's basis at
the time of the gift would still be $1,000, so that under the old law
he would face the same capital gains tax as in the prior example,
$40,000. But inclusion would have the effect of eliminating any ap-
preciation and the gains tax. However, the full amount of the ap-
preciation, $200,000, would be included in the decedent's estate be-
cause of section 2035, and would at the minimum produce an
additional estate tax of $74,000. Here, with post-gift appreciation,
inclusion costs more than the step-up saves.
Finally, if the example given above is altered again so that the
$1,000 property has appreciated to $201,000 at the time of the gift,
the donee would still face a $40,000 capital gains tax liability. On
the other hand, inclusion of the property would eliminate this tax,
and there would be no additional tax cost inasmuch as the
$201,000 would be taken into account in computing the tax to be
paid on the decedent's estate in any event.
Thus, it can be seen from the above examples that in some
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cases the noninclusion of the property as a result of the 1981
change to section 2035 will be advantageous, for the estate tax sav-
ings resulting from exclusion would be larger than the capital gains
tax to be saved from the stepped-up basis resulting from inclusion.
On the other hand, where one is dealing entirely or almost entirely
with pre-gift appreciation, so that this portion of the property
would be subject to tax as a practical matter in the decedent's es-
tate irrespective of when the transfer occurred, inclusion produces
no detriment and therefore there is some loss to the donee by rea-
son of the resulting lack of a step-up in basis.
I. Basis of Property Acquired from the Decedent
The Act contains a special rule to preclude transfers to a dece-
dent for purposes of obtaining a stepped-up basis. This provision
originated in the House bill. There was no comparable provision in
the Senate bill. The original House provision applied to any trans-
fer made within three years of death.113 The conference committee
reduced the period to one year. 40 Thus, under the Act, the basis
step-up provisions of section 1014 do not apply with respect to ap-
preciated property acquired by the decedent as a gift within a year
of his death if the property is to pass directly or indirectly back to
the original donor or donor's spouse. Such a provision appears ap-
propriate in light of the unlimited marital deduction.
The initial estate tax rate, 37%, is higher than the new 20%
maximum rate on capital gains, but an advantage may still result
from passing property through the estate of a decedent if the dece-
dent's estate is less than $600,000 or if there is no tax on his estate
by reason of the use of the unlimited marital deduction. In the
absence of the unlimited marital deduction, it might be questioned
whether any significant amount of this kind of planning would oc-
cur, but with the unlimited marital deduction it is a possibility.
One disadvantage to such an avoidance plan in the case of a
taxable estate is the fact that the estate tax rate is higher than the
maximum rate on capital gains. For example, the amount included
in the estate where the donor transferred property to his father on
the father's deathbed would be the fair market value of the prop-
erty transferred. Thus, if on facts similar to those in the prior ex-
139. Id.
140. S. REP. No. 176, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1981).
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amples, the donor had property which he acquired for $1,000
which appreciated to $101,000 and he then transferred the prop-
erty to his father on his deathbed, the $100,000 appreciation which
would have been subject to a capital gains tax of $20,000 would
have its basis stepped-up and the capital gains tax of $20,000 elim-
inated. However, if the decedent is subject to estate tax at all, he
will be subject to tax at the rate of 37%, 17 points higher than the
maximum advantage to be achieved by the elimination of the capi-
tal gains tax. Moreover, since the property was acquired by gift
from the original donor, that donor's own transfer tax liability will
necessarily be increased. Every transfer above the per donee exclu-
sion level is considered in computing the estate tax so that as a
result of the son's transfer, there would be an additional $91,000 of
taxable transfers which would ultimately have to be considered in
fixing the final rate in the estate of the son. Perhaps the ultimate
increase in transfer tax to be paid by the son is not all that signifi-
cant inasmuch as it is likely to be paid many years in the future.
On the other hand, any transfer tax imposed on the property in
the estate of the decedent is an immediate cost and cannot be
ignored.
This maneuver would thus appear to be practical only when
the property can pass through the decedent's estate without at-
tracting a transfer tax. However, and this justifies the provision,
this could result any time the unlimited marital deduction is
claimed, irrespective of the size of the estate.
As the House report makes clear, a stepped-up basis will be
denied where the original donor receives the benefit of the appreci-
ated property irrespective of whether the bequest is a specific be-
quest, a general bequest, a pecuniary bequest, or a residuary be-
quest.141 The House report implies that the statutory language
"such property is acquired from the decedent by (or passes from
the decedent to) the donor" should be interpreted in the case of a
pecuniary bequest as denying a step-up only if the inclusion of the
appreciated property in the estate affected the amount that the
donor receives under the pecuniary bequest.
4 1
Although the statute denies a full step-up in basis, it does per-
mit the donor-recipient of the property to receive the benefit of




whatever additions to basis are made by the donor. Thus, in the
example above, if the property in the decedent's hands is improved
to the extent of $10,000 so that the decedent had a basis immedi-
ately prior to his death of $11,000, the donor-recipient's basis will
be $11,000, not the $1,000 that he had originally. Moreover, the
statute applies similar rules in the case of property which is sold
by the estate where the donor of the property (or his spouse) is
entitled to the proceeds of sale.143 Finally, if not all of the donated
property is transferred back to the donor or his spouse, then the
stepped-up basis will be available to the extent that the donor is
not to receive the property.
The House report provides a hypothetical example where A
transferred appreciated property with a basis of $10 and a fair
market value of $100 to a prospective decedent within three years
of his death, and the fair market value at the date of death was
$200.144 Under the general rule, A would receive the property with
a $10 basis. In this particular example, the decedent had aug-
mented the basis by $10 so that the donor became entitled to a $20
basis. In another example, it is assumed that the decedent's estate
consisted only of the appreciated property of $200 and liabilities of
$50 so that the donor would be entitled only to three-fourths of the
appreciated property.145 The example explains that the 25% of the
property which the donor would not receive at the donee's death
would be entitled to a stepped-up basis, whereas the three-
quarters received by the donor would not. The example indicates
that the basis of the appreciated property would be $65 in the
hands either of the executor or the heir.146 It may be assumed that
where 25% is disposed of by the executor and the balance is dis-
tributed in kind to the donee, the executor would be able to sell his
quarter income-tax-free and the heir's portion of the property
would have a basis of $15. Thus, the basis of the appreciated prop-
erty in the hands of the executor would be $50 (the fair market
value of one-quarter) and the three-quarters passing to the donor
would be entitled to a basis of $15 (three-quarters of the donor's
basis).
143. I.R.C. § 1014(e)(2)(B) (1982).
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J. Extensions of Time for Payment of Estate Tax Respecting In-
terests in Closely Held Businesses
Since the Revenue Act of 1976, there have been two overlap-
ping provisions which permitted the deferred payment of estate
taxes attributable to closely held businesses, sections 6166 and
6166A, and other provisions offering special advantages: section
303 (capital gain redemption) and section 6601(j) (low interest
rate).
For income tax purposes under section 303, if more than 50%
of the gross estate consists of stock in a single corporation (or, in
certain circumstances, of more than one corporation), the redemp-
tion of all or a portion of this stock to pay estate taxes and admin-
istration expenses is eligible for capital gain rather than dividend
treatment.
Section 6166, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, provides
for a five year deferral of the payment of estate taxes, followed by
a ten year installment payment of those taxes if the value of the
interest in a closely held business exceeded 65% of the adjusted
gross estate, but only to the extent of the tax attributable to the
closely held business interest. Section 6601(0) provides a 4% rate
of interest with respect to the deferred installments to the extent
of the first $1,000,000 in closely held business interests.
Under section 6166A, an extension of time for payment of the
estate tax is permitted where the value of the interest in a closely
held business exceeds either 35% of the gross estate or 50% of the
taxable estate, but only to the extent that the tax is attributable to
the value of the interest in the closely held business. Under section
6166A, the tax may be paid in up to ten equal installments, the
interest rate on which was not reduced as in the case of installment
payments under section 6166.
There were differences between the two provisions in terms of
the definition of what constituted a closely held business. Nonethe-
less, under both provisions, the tax balance was accelerated if there
was a failure to pay any installment on time or if there was a dis-
position of a specified fraction of the value of the decedent's inter-
est in the business-although this fraction was one-third, in the
case of section 6166, and one-half in the case of section 6166A.
Both the Finance and the Ways and Means Committees wisely
concluded that these various provisions should be simplified and
coordinated to provide a single set of rules. The 1981 Act essen-
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tially achieves that result.147
K. Disclaimers
1. In general. The gift tax treatment of disclamers has had a
long but unhappy history. Although section 2518 was added in an
effort to provide certainty, it is not clear that this has been its ef-
fect as numerous interpretive difficulties have been recognized
since its enactment.1 48 The change in the statute which was pro-
posed by both the Finance and Ways and Means Commit-
tees-permitting a direct transfer from the primary recipient of
property, as directed by the will, to the person who would receive
the property if a disclaimer were made-is likely to do little to
abate the difficulties surrounding section 2518.
The rules prior to section 2518 with respect to disclaimers
were relatively straightforward, even though the results varied con-
siderably depending on local law. The context in which the issue
arises is one in which the decedent leaves property to his wife, for
example, and post-mortem estate planning establishes that the de-
cedent's and his widow's total estate tax burdens would be less-
ened if the widow disclaims all or a portion of the bequest. Alter-
natively, the bequest may be to a son who disclaims since the
property will pass under the decedent's will to the son's children,
and the son avoids a gift or estate tax by disclaiming rather than
accepting the property and transferring it to his children. In either
event, under the rules as they developed prior to 1976, no gift tax
liability was incurred by the disclaimant provided he did not ac-
cept any of the benefits of the property transferred and the dis-
claimer was effective under local law as a true disclaimer-that is,
it was a refusal to accept rather than an acceptance followed by a
transfer. If there was an acceptance followed by a transfer, a gift
tax liability would be imposed.1 49 If the recipient died between the
acceptance and the transfer, an estate tax liability would be im-
147. I.R.C. § 6166 (1982).
148. See Frimmer, Proposed Regs. Under Section 2518 Explain and Expand The Fed-
eral Disclaimer Statute, 53 J. TAX'N 266 (1980); Frimmer, Disclaimers After the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976; Chaos out of Disorder, 31 S. CAL. TAx INsT. 811 (1979); Frimmer,Using
Disclaimers in Post-Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J.
TAx'N 322 (1978).
149. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511.1(c) (1973); Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
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posed. Thus, the result of a disclaimer depended on local law,
which necessarily varied from state to state. Moreover, it can be
argued that real estate could not be disclaimed in many jurisdic-
tions since under the common law title vested immediately upon
the death of the decedent in the named recipient and, therefore, he
necessarily was deemed to have received the property even though
he in fact enjoyed no benefit from it and transferred it as soon as
could possibly be done.150
It was with this background that section 2518 was added by
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Rumor has it that the provision was
drafted by representatives of the American Bankers Association
and received comparatively little attention from either House of
Congress prior to its insertion in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Be
that as it may, many interpretative problems are presented by sec-
tion 2518, even though it seems relatively straightforward on its
face. It provides that if any person makes a qualified disclaimer
with respect to any interest in property, then the federal estate
and gift taxes shall apply with respect to the interest as if the in-
terest had never been transferred to the person making the dis-
claimer. A qualified disclaimer is defined as an irrevocable and un-
qualified refusal by a person who is left an interest in property,
provided such refusal is in writing, the person has not accepted the
interest or any of its benefits, and it passes without any direction
on the part of the person making the disclaimer to the spouse of
the decedent or to a person other than the person making the dis-
claimer. Finally, the disclaimer must be made no later than nine
months after the later of: (1) the date on which the disclaimant
attains age twenty-one or (2) the date of the transfer creating the
interest in the disclaimant. Disclaimers of undivided portions of
interests are permitted. A power with respect to property is treated
as an interest in property.
The scholarly writing in this area has identified many difficul-
ties with respect to section 2518.151 One major difficulty, however,
has to do with the issue of whether a disclaimer must be effective
under local law. It may have been thought by the draftsmen of
150. See generally CRIBBET, FRITZ & JOHNSON, PROPERTY 314-15 (1960). Cf. 45 Fed.
Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518) (proposed July 22, 1980) ("A
disclaimant is not considered as accepting property because under applicable local law to
the property vests immediately in the disclaimant upon the death of a decedent.").
151. See supra note 148.
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section 2518 that they had written a statute which eliminated the
effects of local law and established a uniform federal rule with re-
spect to disclaimers.
On its face, the requirement that the disclaimer be made
within nine months implies that it was thought that a uniform rule
was being established. On the other hand, the requirement that the
interest pass without any direction on the part of the person mak-
ing the disclaimer can be interpreted as requiring that the dis-
claimer be valid under local law. The key issue under local law,
which until recently was still being litigated, is the question of
whether a disclaimer of a remainder has occurred in a reasonable
time where the disclaimer is not made until the remainder vests in
possession rather than at the time the remainder interest is cre-
ated.152 The discussion in the House report in 1976 reflects the fact
that with the enactment of section 2518, Congress intended to cre-
ate a uniform federal standard so that a disclaimer would be effec-
tive for federal estate and gift tax purposes whether or not valid
under local law. 153 However, section 2518 has been interpreted,
probably correctly, as requiring that the prospective disclaimant be
prepared to demonstrate that he meets all the requirements of fed-
eral law, including the execution and the transfer of the disclaimer
within nine months of the creation of the interest (assuming he is
over twenty-one), and that the disclaimer is effective as a dis-
claimer under local law.'" Under this interpretation, as state law
varies, there is comparatively little uniformity established by sec-
tion 2518.
2. Legislative history. Both the Ways and Means and Fi-
nance Committees proposed to amend section 2518, although per-
haps somewhat differently. The House version of the disclaimer
provision ultimately prevailed. The conference report indicates
152. Jewett v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980), afl'd, 102 S.Ct. 1082
(1982)(1972 disclaimer of a remainder interest was a gift even though valid under state
law-the income interest had not yet terminated-was not made within a reasonable time
since disclaimant received his interest in 1939).
153. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-68 (1976).
154. E.g., I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 7951034 (Sept. 6, 1979). But cf. Estate of O.W.
Newman, Jr., 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 898 (1979), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1096 (5th. Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981)(1974 disclaimers pursuant to § 2056(d)(2) which complied with
the requirements of that section, but are nevertheless invalid under state law, are ineffective
for the purpose of determining the marital deduction; Judge Tannenwald implies in his
opinion that § 2518 does not require a disclaimer to be valid under state law).
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that except for technical language differences the Senate version
was the same as the House bill, but it appears from an examina-
tion of the Senate language added to House Joint Resolution 266
that this may not be the case.1"5
The Senate language added section 2518(c)(3), entitled "Re-
fusals Ineffective Under State Law."15 It provides that for pur-
poses of the rule requiring the interest pass without any direction
on the part of the person making the disclaimer, the property shall
be treated as passing without any direction if three conditions are
met: (1) the unqualified refusal to accept such interest must com-
port with the requirements applicable to the federal disclaimer
rules, (2) the refusal cannot result in the passing of such interest
under applicable state law, and (3) the person making such refusal
transfers within the federal time limitations such interest to the
person to whom the interest would have passed had the refusal
been an effective disclaimer under applicable state law. Whether or
not the Senate language is different from that of the Act, it still
seems to require that the individual recognize that his disclaimer is
ineffective prior to the expiration of the federal period for
disclaiming.
3. Problems with the change. It does not appear that Con-
gress has enacted a solution to ineffective disclaimers except for a
few cases. The Act adds to section 2518 a new subsection (c)(3)
which provides that the general rule of section 2518 applies where
there is a written transfer of the transferor's entire interest in the
property which meets requirements similar to the requirements
that: (1) the writing be received by the estate of the decedent or
the transferor of the interest within nine months of the transfer
creating the interest, (2) the person has not accepted the interest
or any of its benefits, and (3) the transfer is made to a person or
persons who would have received the property had the transferor
made a qualified disclaimer. If these conditions are met, the trans-
fer will be treated as a valid disclaimer. Apparently the belief of
the congressional committees, particularly evidenced by the Senate
report, was that this provision will solve the uniformity problem
presently existing with respect to section 2518. Careful analysis of
the provision suggests, however, that in most cases it will not.




It must be recognized that there was no problem under old
section 2518 for those who were well informed. There is no unrea-
sonable difficulty, if one is well advised, in making a disclaimer
which is effective under local law and meets the federal require-
ments as well. The difficulty arises when the uninformed, with no
eye on either local law or the federal statute, undertake to make a
disclaimer or where a disclaimer is made with an eye on only local
law or only federal law. The solution offered by new section
2518(c)(3) is another option for those who are well advised. There
is little to help the uninformed.
There are two circumstances where section 2518(c)(3) will help
the uninformed. One case is where proper guidance is received, al-
beit a bit late, but not too late. For example, assume that local law
requires that an effective disclaimer be made within six months
after the transfer of property takes place. Assume further that the
recipient is not advised of the existence of this local requirement
until seven months have passed, although he has done nothing to
accept the benefits of the property. If he then makes a disclaimer,
which would be timely for federal estate and gift tax purposes, he
will nevertheless be deemed to have made a transfer because sec-
tion 2518 will not apply. However, if his counsel at this point is
familiar with new section 2518(c)(3), he can prepare an instrument
which will be effective under local law, although not labeled a dis-
claimer, which will transfer the property directly from the disclai-
mant to the individual who would receive the property had an ef-
fective disclaimer been ified under local law. Section 2518(c)(3) will
then apply, and no gift tax liability will be incurred by the
disclaimant.
Consider, however, the more likely scenarios. Case 1: Under
local law a disclaimer fied within ten months of the transfer of the
interest is effective and a disclaimer is made nine and one-half
months after the date of transfer. While it is fully effective under
local law, it fails the time requirements of section 2518 and a gift
tax liability results. Section 2518(c)(3) provides no help.
Case 2: If the disclaimant is unaware that he has six months
under local law to disclaim, and after seven months his counsel
prepares a document labeled "Disclaimer" which purports to dis-
claim his interest in the property, such an instrument would meet
all the requirements of section 2518 putting new 2518(c)(3) aside,
and it would appear to be effective to avoid a gift tax liability if
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only the federal statute is consulted. However, assume that on au-
dit the validity of the disclaimer is questioned, and it is discovered
that since the disclaimer was made seven months after the original
transfer, it is ineffective under local law. Section 2518 is inapplica-
ble; and an unnecessary gift tax liability is incurred. New section
2518(c)(3) will not provide relief in this instance. What will have
been drafted is an instrument which is labeled "Disclaimer," which
will read something to the effect that "I hereby disclaim all right,
title and interest in the property left me by my dear Aunt Sophie,
and I declare that I refuse to accept this interest or any of it's
benefits." If this is the form of the instrument, it will be exceed-
ingly difficult for a revenue agent or even for a court to character-
ize this document as "a written transfer of the transferor's entire
interest in the property which is to a person or persons who would
have received the property had the transferor made a qualified dis-
claimer... ." Would it not be better to write a statute which pro-
vides a federal rule for disclaimers, which ignores the issue of
whether the property technically has been accepted and trans-
ferred under local law (as is in effect done under new section
2518(c)(3)) and which validates local law disclaimers not meeting
the tests of local law?
Clearly there are states in which the law with respect to dis-
claimers takes a somewhat unusual form.15 Under these laws a dis-
claimer which is executed after the time for making an effective
disclaimer is not valid as a disclaimer, but is deemed to transfer
the property to the individual who would receive the property had
the disclaimer been valid. In other words, in those states, even
though the document is labeled "Disclaimer" and takes the stan-
dard form for such an instrument, that document has the effect of
passing the disclaimed property as if a deed of gift had been exe-
cuted. It would seem that, as to transfers in such states, the new
legislation would validate what would be an otherwise invalid
disclaimer.
It may also be questioned whether the new section 2518(c)(3)
will be of assistance in those situations where the nature of the
property is such that under local law it cannot be disclaimed. In
these situations, one would be in a position to execute a document
157. See, e.g., S.D. CODU'iD LAWS ANN., § 43-4-34 (Supp. 1982); TExAS PROB. CODE
ANN., § 37A (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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which would transfer one's interest to a person who would have
received the property had the transferor made a qualified dis-
claimer. On the other hand, it may be questioned whether such a
transfer meets "requirements similar to the requirements of para-
graph (2) and (3) of subsection (b)," which require that a person
has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits. 58 Under local
law, the transferor will be deemed automatically to have received
the interest and would be entitled to its benefits if he did not act
to transfer them. It would seem that the transfer could only take
place after they have been received as a legal, if not as a practical,
matter.
CONCLUSION
Although this survey of the effect of the 1981 changes in fed-
eral estate and gift tax law may seem rather long, there are many
issues raised by that legislation which remain to be explored. No
doubt over the next several years some of these issues will be re-
solved by regulations, rulings, and court decisions. As to others, a
consensus will develop among the commentators. As is the case
with any complex piece of legislation, however, there will be troub-
lesome issues which will continue to plague even the careful practi-
tioner and will not be solved, if at all, for many years to come.
In reflecting upon this area of the law, there are two salient
points which immediately come to mind-perhaps one should
say-questions. First, is it necessary to have an estate and gift tax
law which is so complex, especially considering the limited amount
of revenue which it raises? Second, have not the 1981 amendments
produced so radical a change in the application of our estate and
gift taxes to the extremely wealthy-compared to those of more
modest means-as to make these taxes inequitable?
158. LR.C. § 2518(c)(3)(A) (1982).
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